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United States versus Lazarenko:
Filling in Gaps in Support and Regulation of Transnational Relationships
Philip M. Nichols*
Summary
The prosecution in the United States of Pavlo Lazarenko for corruption merits study for
two reasons. First, it provides case study of the use of local laws to deal with a transnational act.
Law should support and regulates interaction within communities; local laws that stop at the
borders do little to support transnational communities and international law, which does not
recognize most transnational persons as legitimate subjects of international law, does even less.
The court that tried Lazarenko could not therefore rely solely on its local law nor could it turn to
nonexistent transnational law; instead it cobbled together local U.S. law and local Ukrainian law.
At different times in the process, the court exhibited skill and a lack of sensitivity to the process.
In cobbling together local laws, the court also created a tool for controlling
transnationally corrupt public officials. Corruption presents a significant obstacle to global and
local development and growth. The creation of a tool to combat transnational corruption offers
possible amelioration for many more who suffer the degradations of corruption.
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In August of 2006, a United States District Court in San Francisco sentenced Pavlo
Lazarenko, the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, to serve nine years in prison.1 Pavlo
Lazarenko stood convicted of corrupt acts, including money laundering, wire fraud, and
transportation of stolen property.2 Lazarenko certainly does not stand alone as a convicted
corrupt politician.3 His conviction is unique, however, as the first in the United States of a
foreign leader based in part on the violation of laws in that leader’s home country.4
The particulars of Lazarenko’s case are provocative. Lazarenko inflicted a tremendous
amount of damage on Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. He subverted the transition of a nation
emerging from years of occupation. He manipulated banks and financial institutions in a number
of countries.5 In the particulars, his conviction constitutes justice.
Even more important than the particulars of Lazarenko’s actions, however, although not
as sensational, is the manner in which the trial court used laws. Lazarenko did not conform his
malfeasance to the borders of a single country; like many corrupt officials his actions took place
across political boundaries. Lazarenko was an internationally corrupt person. The traditional
theory of international law, however, does not recognize Lazarenko as an international actor, and
therefore does not provide a means to control him.

1

See Jesse McKinley, 9 Years In U.S. Prison For Ex-Premier. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at A3
(describing sentence and noting that this was the first conviction of a former leader since that of
Manuel Noriega of Panama).
2
See United States v. Lazarenko, 469 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2006), reprinted as am’d United
States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2623 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007), am’d, rehear’g denied,
rehear’g en banc denied, United States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2612 (9th Cir. Feb.
7, 2007) (describing the conviction).
3
See Peter W. Schroth, Corruption and Accountability of the Civil Service in the United States,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 553, 553-568 (2006) (providing examples of corruption proceedings in the
United States); see generally John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 293, (2000) (book review) (discussing corruption in the United States).
4
Manuel Noriega was convicted of violations of U.S. laws. See Recent Case – Separation of
Powers – Head-of-State Immunity – Eleventh Circuit Holds That the Executive Branch’s Capture
of Noriega Exempts Him from Head-of-State Immunity, 111 HARV. L. REV. 849, 849 (1998)
(noting that the United States charged Manuel Noriega with violation of U.S. drug laws).
5
See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.

The failure of international law does not mean that Lazarenko’s behavior should escape
punishment.6 Corruption presents perhaps the greatest obstacle to social and economic
development throughout the world.7 The world is increasingly comprised of transnational
communities, but international law fails to support or to regulate these transnational
communities, particularly with respect to the control of corruption.8 Until international law
catches up to the world, some other means of supporting or controlling transnational behaviors
must be devised. Cobbling together local laws so that they roughly fit transnational behaviors
provides one interim solution. That is precisely what occurred in the conviction of Pavlo
Lazarenko: a United States District Court cobbled together two sets of local laws to create a
viable and fair mechanism for trying a transnational criminal.
The conviction of Pavlo Lazarenko is meaningful because justice always matters, and a
bad person has earned his dues.9 The trial of Pavlo Lazarenko, however, is perhaps even more
noteworthy as a case study of the cobbling together of local laws. As with any case study, it
supplies lessons regarding best and worst practices.10 The trial of Pavlo Lazarenko also suggests
a new and potent tool for combating the devastating phenomenon of transnational corruption.
For these reasons, any person interested in either transnational communities in general or
corruption in particular must examine this case.
This paper begins with an exposition of the general failure of international law.11 It then
briefly recounts the actions of Pavlo Lazarenko, and explains how corruption damages societies

6

See Patrick Donahue, Corruption Watchdog Downgrades U.S.: Scandals Hurt America’s
Standing, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A25 (quoting the executive officer of Transparency
International as emphasizing a need for some device for prosecuting transnationally corrupt
actors).
7
See Alexandru Grigorescu, The Corruption Eruption in East-Central Europe: The Increased
Salience of Corruption and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations, 20 E. EUR. POL. &
SOC. 516, 519 (2006) (Corruption “is now seen as one of the greatest threats to the survival of
new democracies around the world.”).
8
See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; Antonin Cohen, Constitutionalism Without
Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the
Making of a Constitution for Europe (1940s81960s), 32 LAW & SOC. INQ. 109, 109-110 (2007)
(describing the creation of a transnational community not aided by local legal systems); Philip
M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 261-269 (1999) (discussing transnational communities).
9
See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1443 (2001) (“doing justice is an important value in its own
right”).
10
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 656 (1998) (using the “case study” of a Moscow
storefront to find insights into the role of law in a transition economy); Robert A. Katzmann,
Making Sense of Congressional Intent: Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE
L.J. 2345, 2353 (1995) (“case studies have important implications for scholars interested in the
role of courts in the policy process”).
11
See infra notes 16-58 and accompanying text.

such as Ukraine’s.12 The paper then examines the trial of Pavlo Lazarenko through analysis of
two orders issued by the trying court.13 The paper looks at what was done well and what was not
done well in those orders, and the interplay between a trial of this type and issues surrounding
sovereignty.14 Finally, the paper fixes the technique exemplified by the trial of Lazarenko into
the network of tools available for dealing with transnational corruption.15
1. Criticisms of International Law
Criticisms of international law abound.16 The predominant theory of international law,
and thus the primary target of such criticism, traces its philosophical roots to Aristotle, its
primary assumptions regarding international actors to the Treaty of Westphalia, and its principle
tenets to Grotius and Leibniz.17 Other theoretical frameworks with roots in other places, such as
Vedic tenets18 or the Ikh Yasa of the vast Mongolian empire19 or rules of the African

12

See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text; see also notes 74-128 and accompanying text
(discussing damage caused by corruption)
13
See infra notes 129-206 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 207-269 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 270-302 and accompanying text.
16
See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A Bibliography,
35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (1994) (noting “a dramatic increase during the past two decades in
the volume of scholarly work that aims to rethink the foundations of international law and to
respond to recent trends in political, social, and legal theory”); Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on
the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 404
(1994) (discussing criticism of the concept of sovereignty).
17
See JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (9th ed. 1984); see also
Ann-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 721-22 (1995) (noting that the realist school dominated
international relations theory for “virtually the past two millennia, from Thucydides to
Machiavelli to Morgenthau”).
18
See VED P. NANDA & SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, HINDU LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (1996); S.N.
Al Habsy & Kishor Uprety, Cooperation for Nominal Development or Politics for Actual
Survival? South Asia in the Making of International Law, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 2324 (2002) (discussing the role of South Asia on the formation of international law). Hindu
principles of international law differ from European tenets in that ancient Hindu rules governing
the interactions among sovereigns were based on Dharma rather than on consensus. See Ved P.
Nanda, International Law in Ancient Hindu India, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991). Similarly, “Islamic law,
and hence Islamic international law, simply holds a different conception of law than does
Western law, and hence public international law. . . . Islamic law draws its legitimacy from God,
not from agreement. Therefore Islam cannot adduce consent, as does public international law, as
the justification for public order.” David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public
International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 819, 870, 877-78
(1993) (footnotes omitted).

kingdoms,20 were ground to dust or overwhelmed during the European period of colonization.21
More recent theories of international law based on other intellectual paradigms, such as that
propounded by socialist systems22 or by critical legal studies,23 have had nowhere near the
influence of the dominant theory of international law.24

19

See JACK WEATHERFORD, GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD xix
(2004) (describing rules governing relations among different cultures in Mongolian Empire);
Denise1 Aigle, Le Grand Jasaq de Gengis-Khan, l’empire, la Culture Mongole et la Shari’a,
47 J. ECON. & SOC. HIST. ORIENT 31, 31-60 (2004) (discussing content of the law and the
distinction between written law and customary law). Saul Levmore describes the Ikh Yasa
without focusing on the manner in which it organized relations between cultures. See Saul
Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort
Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235, 280-85 (1986); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the
Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879,
924-28 (1986). Weatherford points out that many aspects of the Mongolian ordering of
international relationships continue to exist in the modern system – including diplomatic
immunity. WEATHERFORD, supra, at xix.
20
See David N. Edwards, Meroe and the Sudanic Kingdoms, 39 J. AFR. HIST. 175, 176-90
(1998) (discussing the relationships between the Kushite States and Sudanic Kingdoms); Richard
Reid, Mutesa and Mirambo: Thoughts on East African Warfare and Diplomacy in the
Nineteenth Century, 31 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 73, 73-81 (1998) (discussing rules and
relationships between the Bugando Kingdom and the Nyamwezi Empire in the second half of the
nineteenth century).
21
Christopher Blakesley states:
The international law of today does not show distinct linkages to ancient Oriental
and African practices. Even the modern descendants of very old Oriental cultures
accept international law as the product of Western evolution. Ignorance and
neglect in the West of the history of law and related institutions in the East
constitute the most likely explanation of this omission. Scholars in some of the
modern States that have evolved from the Oriental historical matrix sometimes
chide the West for this inattention and threaten (usually mildly) to set the matter
aright sometime. New States in Africa sometimes are heard in similar vein.
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1432 (5th ed. 2001):
see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1-2 (1999) (“The universalization of
international law was principally a consequence of the imperial expansion that took place
towards the end of the ‘long nineteenth century.’ . . . By 1914, after numerous colonial wars,
virtually all the territories of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific were controlled by the major European
states, resulting in the assimilation of all these non-European peoples into a system of law that
was fundamentally European in that it derived from European thought and experience.”).
22
See THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH, SOZIALISTISCHES VOLKERRECHT? 272-85 (1979) (the “highest
principles” of international law include close cooperation, mutual assistance, brotherly
friendship, and unity and compactness); Francis A. Gabor, A Socialist Approach to Codification

The complexity of any school of thought defies simple explanation;25 nonetheless, put
simply traditional international law positions itself as a set of rules through which nations
interact with one another.26 Nations are the principal international actors, with some recognition
of international organizations created by those nations.27 A foundational principle of
international law is that international law concerns itself only with the relations among the
nations and not with the internal processes within those nations.28 Thus, it could be said that
“international law is the law of nations.”29
European international law’s preoccupation with sovereign nations as the only legitimate
international actors, however, is more a historical accident than a discovery of an immutable
truth.30 Indeed, Grotius, who most credit with the first modern compilation of western
international rules in De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres,31 did not concern himself with the nature

of Private International Law in Hungary: Comments and Translation, 55 TUL. L. REV. 63 (1980)
(discussing socialist principles of transnational law.
23
See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 81
(1991) (suggesting a theory of international law that rejects states as primary international actors,
rejects the possibility of objective consensus, and rejects the idea of determinate international
legal obligations and rules).
24
See BLAKESLEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 1432 (“Classical, scholarly Marxists, and many who
are non-Marxist, deprecate the system of customary international law because it seems to them
unavoidably to state, as law, rules and principles fostering the interests of the power elites
asserting them. The socialist States of the former Second World, however, came in practice to
accept the system and many of its most conventional rules and principles, while selectively
seeking to deny status as law to other rules and principles because they are contradictory to
national ideological or other preferences.”).
25
Slaughter cautions against oversimplifying the corpus of traditional international law. AnneMarie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Liberal
International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
717, 727 (1995).
26
See LOUIS OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (4th ed. 1928) (stating that nations are the
actors in international law).
27
See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415 (2000) (stating
that nations have ceded some place in international law to international organizations).
28
See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 26, at 20-21 (setting out the principles of traditional
international legal scholarship); Hersch Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 8 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 106-07 (1927) (same); see also Sol Picciotto, Networks in International
Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17 J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1014, 1018 (1996) (discussing the relationship between traditional international law and the
realist school of international relations and noting that both are state centered).
29
Egon Guttman, The Concept of Neutrality Since the Adoption and Ratification of the Hague
Neutrality Convention of 1907, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 55, 58 (1998).
30
See PHILLIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 249 (1990) (“The
misconceiving of international society as a system of closed sovereignties, externalized statesystems, undemocratized and unsocialized, spread throughout the world.”).
31
See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9, 20 (1966).

the international actor.32 That task was undertaken by Grotius’s intellectual descendant Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, a diplomat for and advisor to various rulers of German principalities;33 Leibniz
spent his life balancing the overarching rule of the Holy Roman Empire against the independence
of his employers.34 Of necessity Leibniz found that sovereigns (his employers) and the polities
they ruled were legitimate international actors.35 Samuel Pufendorf, who followed Leibniz, also
wrestled with the need to legitimize independent states as they freed themselves from the
weakened Holy Roman Empire.36 He posited that independent states “and supreme sovereignty
come from God as the author of natural law,”37 thus providing a foundation upon which the
independent states could place themselves on equal footing with the empire – an argument based
on their divine right to international personhood. The concepts born of the exigencies of Leibniz
and Pufendorf became dogma as generations of international legal scholars – from Wolff through
32

See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
21-22 (1946) (“The significance of the law of nature in his [Grotius’] treatise is that it is the everpresent source for supplementing the voluntary law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the
light of ethics and reason, and for making the reader aware of the fact that the will of states
cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last resort, the decisive source of the law of nations.”).
Thomas Hobbes is also sometimes credited with contributing to the intellectual roots of modern
European international law, even though he himself did not believe in international law.
Precisely because he did not believe in international law he also did not concern himself with the
nature of international actors. See John P. Humphrey, On the Foundations of International Law,
39 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 233 (1945) (noting Hobbes’ belief that “[e]ither a state is sovereign, in
which case it cannot be bound by any law higher than its own, or it is bound by law, in which
case it ceases to be sovereign”); Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International
Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 435 (2006) (noting Hobbes belief that there was no authority binding
sovereigns).
33
JANNE ELISAPETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2004) (stating that Leibniz
was the first writer to us the term “international legal person” and noting that he was an
intellectual successor to Grotius and Hobbes).
34
E.J. AITON, LEIBNIZ: A BIOGRAPHY (1985); see Carl Friedrich, Philosophical Reflections of
Leibniz on Law, Politics and the State, in LEIBNIZ: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, 47, 4751 (Harry Frankfurt ed., 1972) (discussing the historical and intellectual background of Leibniz’s
work).
35
See NIJMAN, supra note 33, at 36-38 (discussing the relationship between Leibniz’s occupation
and his writings on international law)
36
Leibniz, Pufendorf and others also wrote in the shadow of the brutal Thirty Years War. See
Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 527 (2004) (“[J]us gentium
earned its international appeal after the Thirty Years War devastated several centuries’ brilliant
civilizational achievements in Europe. After witnessing the misery of the war, pioneering
philosophers and legal scholars strived to achieve a mutually supportive and peaceful human
community. These innovators attempted to tame and regulate brutal and irrational human
behaviors – often committed in the name of sovereignty – through jus gentium.”).
37
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS Book VII.III 1 and 2, p.1000-1
(transl. & ed. Classics of International Law 1934).

Vattel and Kant to Kelsen – preoccupied themselves with this conception in international legal
personhood and developed rules for interaction between those international persons.38
For many years this accidental body of law was criticized as sterile and positivist, little
more than a description of the ways in which nations interacted.39 The most significant
refinement of international law in the recent era responded to this criticism: the New Haven
school inserted international politics into international law and endowed international law with
purpose as a tool for policy objectives.40 These changes were lauded as significant, but most of
the basic contours and assumptions remained untouched, including the focus on the nation as the
only legitimate international actor.41
The event that most clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of international law theory in
the twentieth century was the atrocity of the second world war.42 The fact that international legal
theory had no basis for condemning the internal acts of brutal governments startled many
scholars and lay people, and lead to two significant developments: the infusion of natural law
principles into international law, and a growing realization that international law not only enables
international interaction but also imposes some strictures on the behaviors of individual
nations.43
38

See NIJMAN, supra note 33, at 84-85 (discussing the influence of Leibniz and Pufendorf on
succeeding generations of international law scholarship).
39
See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning
of International Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133,
138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968) (criticizing international law as a
“repository of legal rationalizations”); Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International
Law, I BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA 73, 87-88 (1923) (vigorously attacking positivism in
international legal scholarship); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and
Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819 (1990) (criticizing “sterile positivism” in
international law scholarship).
40
See Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104
YALE L.J. 1991, 1992 (1995) (book review) (noting that the New Haven School “breaks
radically” from positivism); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819-820 (1990) (“Connecting law with context and policy,
the approach [the New England School] shows that legal decisions involve choice.”).
41
Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law, 42 KAN. L.
REV. 557, 593-94 (1994); see LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 10 (1989) (an advocate of the New
Haven School suggests that there is too much emphasis on the state).
42
David J. Bederman, The New International Law in an Old Age of Indeterminacy, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1521, 1527-28 (2003) (book review); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 227-29 (1997); see AnneMarie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 207-20 (1993) (reviewing development of international legal scholarship
following the second world war).
43
Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1135 (1985) (discussing the changes in the
conceptualization of international law as reactions to the second world war and the Nuremburg
Trials).

In the twenty-first century, the event that so far most clearly demonstrates the
shortcomings of international law is the undeniable phenomenon underlying the much abused
term “globalization,” although how international law will react has yet to be seen. Globalization
means many things to many people.44 The least satisfying of the many theories or definitions
simply observes that more business now occurs across borders than did a few years ago.45 More
troubling theories of globalization invest those relationships with some form of animus, an
attempt by those who posses power to take advantage of those without.46 The more interesting
definitions try to explain the increase in transborder relationships, whether through changes in
technology or changes in attitude.47 For the purposes of this paper, the superiority of one
definition over another is not relevant.48 What is relevant is the observable and indisputable fact
underlying the theoretical cacophony – more people are entering into more relationships, without
reference to political boundaries.49
These relationships highlight an axiological criticism of international law theory and
practice. The theory of international law simply does not explain reality.50 Traditional
44

See ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 8-32
(1992) (discussing the disagreements over the definition of globalization).
45
Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 337 (2004) (defining
globalization as “freer movement of capital and goods”).
46
See Jamie Doucette, APEC: The Long March Through the Inquiries; Inquiry Into Policing of
Demonstrations at 1997 Meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, CANADIAN DIMENSION,
Nov. 1, 2001, at 35 (“We may even assist other complacent westerners in recognizing and
publicizing the history of antidemocratic schemes that have been used to implement neoliberal
globalization worldwide.”); Richard Sanders, GATS: The End Of Democracy?, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REV., June 15, 2001, at 6 (arguing that the World Trade Organization is undemocratic and is the
secret instrument of global corporate interests).
47
Anthony Giddens, for example, notes that technological changes have compressed time and
space, a phenomenon he refers to as “distanciation,” and suggests that as a consequence
relationships have been “disembedded” from the local context and restructured “across indefinite
spans of time-space.” ANTHONY GIDDENS, CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 14, 21 (1990).
Roland Robertson similarly acknowledges the impact of technological changes but suggests they
have lead to a change in the way that people understand the world, a “simultaneity and the
interpenetration of what are conveniently called the global and the local.” ROLAND ROBERTSON,
GLOBAL MODERNITIES 35 (1995).
48
The author has reviewed theories of globalization elsewhere. See Nichols, supra note 8, at
261-264.
49
See Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50 (noting that
relationships are now created with little regard for political boundaries); Barney Warf,
International Competition Between Satellite and Fiber Optic Carriers: A Geographic
Perspective, 58 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 1, 5 (2006) (describing at length “the rapid
expansion of demand for international telecommunications, itself driven by the steady growth of
multinational corporations, global business travelers, international tourism, mounting
transcontinental telephony, and cross-border sales of television shows”).
50
Hector Fix-Fierro and Sergio Lopez-Allyan suggest that traditional jurisprudential thought is
ill-prepared to deal with the broad concept of globalization because traditional jurisprudence was
formed within the concept of the nation/state system. Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Allyan,

international law posits a handful of actors in a single, albeit complex, arena. For the most part
the theory treats other entities as having only one important relationship – the relationship with
the nation that represents them in international law as determined through internal processes
within that nation, internal processes that for the most part lie outside the bounds of international
law.
In reality, however, the vast, vast majority of transnational actors are individuals.
Individuals enter into thousands of relationships across political borders every day.51 Moreover,
an individual may belong to several communities, some existing solely within the political
borders of one country, some explicitly crossing borders, and some with no reference to nations
at all. With rare exceptions these groups must create rules and institutions to facilitate their
relationships. International law, however, does not recognize let alone explain or make
predictions regarding these rules and institutions. International law, therefore, fails as a theoretic
for the bulk of transnational activity.52
International law is equally inadequate in practice. Law constitutes a critical element in
creating and supporting relationships, and in regulating behaviors inimical to relationships and to
groups.53 International law, with its focus on only a handful of transnational actors, does not
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provide a structure, nor does it itself regulate most inimical behaviours. The scholarship of
Douglass North and other institutional economists,54 of Robert Putnam and other development
theorists,55 and of Neil Fligstein and other business sociologists,56 clearly demonstrate the
necessity of rules and institutions in effectuating relationships. International law provides no
such support or regulation.
In the absence of laws that transcend national borders in the same way as relationships,
transnational groups could create their own extralegal body of rules.57 Such rules, however,
impose maintenance costs on the group and on society and do not lend themselves to easy
enforcement.58 The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko represents an alternative interim solution:
the cobbling together of extant local laws to reach and regulate the behaviors of a transnational
actor.
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2. Pavlo Lazarenko
In June of 1996, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma appointed Pavlo Lazarenko – a
former Soviet agricultural boss, governor, government minister, and Ukrainian vice-premier – as
Prime Minister of the recently liberated nation of Ukraine.59 Shortly before assuming the post of
Prime Minister, Lazarenko had served as Energy Minister. Although his supporters argue that
Lazarenko brought law and order to the sector, his reforms had loopholes through which certain
individuals could and did profit. Most notable among these individuals was Lazarenko himself.
During his tenure as Energy Minister, Lazarenko accrued large quantities of money purchasing
and selling state energy contracts. Lazarenko used his control of state petroleum firms to buy
natural gas at a subsidized rate, which he then sold at world market prices. Some reports claim
that he accumulated more than 700 million U.S. dollars through this scheme. To move and
launder his illgotten fortune, Lazarenko developed an elaborate network of financial institutions
in a number of countries. Domestically, Lazarenko laundered his gains Ukraine’s barter-based
economy. Natural gas is the most vital commodity to Ukrainian industry, which often procures
necessary gas through barter. Lazarenko therefore was able to leverage illegally procured gas
into virtually any commodity through unregistered barter transactions; he could then trade the
goods on the open world market.60
During Lazarenko’s tenure as Energy Minister, he developed close relationships with
leaders of various energy industries, including Yulia Tymoshenko, the President of United
Energy Systems of Ukraine. These allies profited from their relationships with Lazarenko.
Lazarenko awarded Tymoshenko’s United Energy Systems contract to supply one third of
Ukraine natural gas needs. United Energy Systems benefited further from Lazarenko’s
patronage when, as Prime Minister, he partitioned Ukraine’s energy market into separate sectors,
awarding single energy firms monopoly rights in specific regions. Lazarenko facilitated the
award to United Energy Systems of the most profitable contract rights, those of the industrial
oblasts. The business associated with these monopolies accrued revenues equal to one fifth of the
Ukrainian gross domestic product for that year. Lazarenko allegedly received payments from
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various energy companies in exchange for the award of monopolies and in the case of United
Energy Systems also owned shares.61
During his tenure as Prime Minister, President Kuchma awarded Lazarenko medals for
his service to the government. As foreign governments and the Ukrainian parliament voiced
increasing concern over the level of corruption in the Ukrainian government, however,
Kuchma’s support waned.62 In the summer of 1997, President Kuchma forced Prime Minister
Lazarenko from office.63 Once out of office, Lazarenko became a Kuchma opponent and formed
his own opposition party, named “Hromada.” Working closely with Yulia Timoshenko, he set
out to defeat the Kuchma administration in the next series of elections.64 The use of media
illustrates the tenor of the political contest. Hromada contracted to have an offshore company
buy 500,000 subscriptions to Pravda, a Ukrainian paper with a 35,000 subscription base, and
entered into a similar deal with Vseukrainskiye Vedimosti. Not surprisingly, those publications
portrayed Lazarenko quite favorably.65
Kuchma responded fiercely. He had the United Energy System’s trading licenses
revoked and sent auditors to examine United Energy System’s financial records; its bank
accounts were frozen. Pravda and Vseurkainskiye Vedimosti were shut down. The Office of the
Prosecutor General of Ukraine made representations to Parliament about obtaining an agreement
to institute criminal proceedings against People’s Deputy of Ukraine Pavlo Lazarenko for
commission of crimes involving corruption. Lazarenko had hoped for Hromada to catapult him
into the Ukrainian Presidency. Instead, probes into Lazarenko’s illegal activities compelled the
former Prime Minister to flee from Ukraine in 1998. With the Prosecutor General hunting him,
Lazarenko fled to Geneva. The day after Lazarenko fled the country, prosecutors filed
embezzlement charges against him.66
In Switzerland, the former Prime Minister was arrested for attempting to cross the border
using a false Panamanian passport. The Swiss then charged him with money laundering and set
his bail at US$2.6 million. Lazarenko posted bail and promptly fled the country, attempting to
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enter the United States. Once again, Lazarenko was arrested for using false identification
documents to enter a country. While in the custody of U.S. authorities, Lazarenko requested
asylum, claiming he suffered political persecution in Ukraine. This motion was eventually denied
by the United States, which instead filed its own charges against the former Prime Minister.67
Ukraine’s initial concern with Lazarenko undoubtedly was driven in large part by
Kuchma’s anger at the betrayal of a former political ally. Leonid Kuchma’s presidency,
however, did not survive the political turmoil of Ukraine. In 2000, a popular journalist was
kidnapped and murdered. Evidence, including audio tapes, linked Kuchma to that crime. By
2003, tens of thousands of people demonstrated against rigged elections, corruption, and other
undemocratic aspects of the Kuchma regime. In 2005, after a series of contested elections,
demonstrations and court rulings, Viktor Yuschenko – the leader of the party opposed to
Kuchma – became the President of Ukraine.68 Yuschenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as
Prime Minister.69 Tymoshenko, of course, is the former President of United Energy Systems and
an alleged co-conspirator with Pavlo Lazarenko. Tymoshenko, in turn, was dismissed by
Yuschenko along with her cabinet and senior Presidential aides amidst charges of corruption and
discordance.70 Tymoshenko continues to play an active role in Ukrainian politics, almost
regaining the position of Prime Minister and continuing to lead a large opposition party.71
Lazarenko has caused incalculable damage to Ukraine and its people. Even by the
standards of Ukraine, a political system described at that time as enduring “widespread
[corruption] at all levels,” Lazarenko engaged in astonishing degrees of corruption.72
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Transparency International, a respected nongovernmental body that studies corruption, ranked
Pavlo Lazarenko as the eighth most corrupt political leader in the entire world.73 The anger that
Ukrainians felt in response to the corruption of the Kuchma regime, the anger that caused tens of
thousands of Ukrainians to protest in the streets, is entirely understandable. Corruption causes
immeasurable damage, particularly to emerging countries such as Ukraine. In order to fully
understand the import of the criminal proceedings against Pavlo Lazarenko, the damage caused
by corruption must first be examined.
3. Corruption Damages Emerging Economies Such as Ukraine
Corruption affects any polity in a negative manner, but its effects are particularly acute in
emerging economies. As a country only recently emerging from an authoritarian period, in the
nascent stages of its commercial and social relationships with Europe and the rest of the world,
Ukraine fits within both the technical definition and the real world experience of an emerging
economy.74
Selçuk Akçay succinctly and chillingly summarizes empirical research on the effects of
corruption:
It reduces economic growth, retards long-term domestic and foreign investments,
enhances inflation, depreciates national currency, reduces expenditures for
73
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education and health, increases military expenditures, misallocates talent to rentseeking activities, pushes firms underground, distorts markets and the allocation
of resources, increases income inequality and poverty, reduces tax revenues,
increased child and infant mortality rates, distorts the fundamental role of the
government (on enforcement or contracts and protection of property rights), and
undermines the legitimacy of government and of the market economy.75
Of these, four deserve special attention with respect to emerging economies such as Ukraine: the
creation of parallel institutions, the decrease in economic growth and investment, the distortion
of public decisions, and the undermining of support for government and reforms. To put the
matter as succinctly as does Akçay, Ukraine and countries like Ukraine have every right to be
tremendously concerned about corruption.
3.1 Parallel Institutions
Corruption leads to the creation of parallel institutions. Parallel institutions are
institutions created informally to perform the same functions as “official” or existing
institutions.76 In lay terms, parallel institutions include institutions such as “black markets” or
“loan sharking.”77
Parallel institutions often come into existence as a reaction to failures in state sanctioned
institutions, as people attempt to concoct means of getting done that which the state cannot or
will not do for them.78 Patently failed states, such as the rump states of the former Jugoslavia for
75
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example, engender numerous parallel institutions.79 Corruption also engenders the creation of
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In some ways, parallel institutions provide a service by allowing people to do that which
the state will not let them do.83 The creation and maintenance of institutions, however, imposes
costs on a state or society.84 The existence of a parallel institution essentially means that a
country is paying double what it would pay if the official institution worked; the money diverted
to the parallel institutions is money that is not spent on infrastructure or development.85
3.2 Corruption Negatively Affects Economic Growth and Performance
Numerous studies find that corruption negatively affects economic growth and
performance.86 George Abed and Hamid Davoodi, Cooper Drury, Jonathan Kreickhaus, and
Michael Lusztig, Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, Paulo Mauro, and Vito Tanzi and Hamid
Davoodi all find a negative correlation between corruption and economic growth.87 Indeed, Pak
Hung Mo finds that a one percent increase in levels of corruption decreases growth in gross
domestic product by almost three quarters of a percent.88
Corruption decreases foreign investment. Paulo Mauro conducted the most well known
empirical research demonstrating this effect, finding a “negative association between corruption
the Soviet Union); see also Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems:
The Close Relationship Between Public and Private Orders: A Reply to McMillan and
Woodruff, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2478 (2000) (“Hence, if legal systems are dysfunctional due
to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all forms of the private order to emerge: relational
contracts, arbitration, business networks, trade associations, and social networks.”).
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institutions are expensive, and questioning whether some developing countries can afford the
institutions that support democracy); Montrose M. Wolf, The Development of the TeachingFamily Model, 30 J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 381, 381-82 (1997) (comparing the costs of
different models of institutions).
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and investment, as well as growth, [that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic
sense.”89 Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki, and Shang-Jin Wei also find that corruption
decreases foreign investment.90 Edgardo Campos and others find that while “predictable”
government corruption yields less of a negative effect, it still yields a negative effect.91 Alberto
Ades and Rafael Di Tella, Mauro, and Tanzi and Davoodi also find a negative relationship
between corruption and domestic investment.92
Other indicators suggest that corruption negatively affects economic performance. Fahim
Al-Marhubi finds a positive relationship between corruption and inflation.93 Mohsen BahmaniOskooee and A.B.M. Nasir find that corruption depreciates national currency as measured by
real exchange rates.94 Dilip Mhookerjee and Ivan Png start, in an interesting exercise, with an
assumption of no social costs and ignore all transfer costs and are still able to prove that “[f]or
every outcome when bribery is profitable, there exists another in which bribery is not profitable,
that yields higher welfare.”95 In other words, in the aggregate corruption always imposes
economic costs.
The economic costs imposed on emerging economies can be quite high. Hrishikesh
Vinod finds that “[i]n many developing countries, a dollar's worth of corruption causes a $1.67
worth of a burden on the economy.”96 Ukraine almost certainly suffers, and in particular
suffered during Lazarenko’s reign.97
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3.3 Corruption Distorts Decisionmaking by Public Officials
Corruption distorts decisionmaking in two profound ways: by distorting the parameters
by which decisions are made, and by distorting the pool of decisiomakers. The consequences of
a distorted decisionmaking process are severe. As Josef Zieleniec, former Foreign Minister of
the Czech Republic, observes:
[C]orruption usurps and replaces other standard selection mechanisms – and thus
puts the economy in a dangerously irreversible position – one in which reducing
corruption might actually destabilise the economy. If a large number of public
servants are corrupt, a closed system is created, which prevents the country from
progressing normally. Suddenly, alternative, honest forms of decisionmaking are
threatened with extinction.98
Corruption distorts the process of decisionmaking in two ways. The most straightforward
involves the results of economic decision. Corruption, and especially bribery, often involves
economic decisions.99 In a rational market system, decisions about which good or service to
purchase are made on the basis of price and quality.100 A corrupt decisionmaker, on the other
hand, does not consider price or quality but instead makes a decision based on the size and
quality of a bribe.101 At best, the product of such decisionmaking is lower quality goods and
services; at worst the product is large scale misallocation of the limited resources of the polity.102
Empirical studies bear out this prediction: Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz de Mello and Raju Sharan find a
link between corruption and disproportionate military spending,103 while Tanzi and Davoodi find
a negative relationship between corruption and the percentage of paved roads in good condition
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and Mauro finds a negative relationship between levels of corruption and the ratio of both public
education spending and public health spending to gross domestic product.104
Corruption also affects the decisionmaking process by creating an incentive for public
officials to delay, obfuscate or hide information.105 This effect encompasses both poor decision
outcomes and an inefficient decisionmaking process. A study of the issuance of driving licenses
in Delhi, India by Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan
found both affects of corruption.106 In an endemically corrupt setting, the investigators found
that seventy percent of those issued driving licenses did not even take a driving examination, and
that thirty percent of those given licenses could not drive.107 At the same time, the investigators
found that bureaucrats created artificial barriers and delays, probably for the purpose of
extracting illegal payments from applicants.108
Corruption not only causes bad decisions to be made, but it also degrades the pool of
public officials who make decisions. “[T]he pervasiveness of corruption contributes to its
persistence in a significant way”109 by causing capable and honest persons to avoid corrupt
bureaucracies.110 At the same time, corrupt systems tend to attract corrupt actors, and the
“‘corruption field’ of social interaction is constantly replenished as new ‘members of the cast’
are added to it.”111 Honest people tend to leave, dishonest people tend to join, and the
bureaucracy suffers.
104
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3.4 Corruption Degrades the Quality of Life and Corrodes Support for Reform
As should be expected of a process that misallocates public and private resources,
corruption degrades the quality of life for persons living in endemically corrupt polities.
Scholars have measured several of the ways in which corruption degrades life. Sanjeev Gupta,
Hamid Davoodi and Erwin Tiongson, for example, find that corruption increases child mortality
rates, lowers child birthwieght, and increases the dropout rate of children from primary school;112
similarly, Maureen Lewis finds strong negative relationships between corruption and the
performance and viability of healthcare systems.113 Lorenzo Pelligrini and Reyer Gerlagh find
that corruption negatively affects environmental policy and the quality of the environment.114
Nejat Anbarci, Monica Ascaleras and Charles Register even find a relationship between
corruption and increases in traffic fatalities.115
Bad government and degradation of the quality of life breed cynicism and corrode
support for government and economic reforms.116 Indeed, many social scientists consider
corruption to be the single greatest threat to the development of democracy in emerging
economies.117 Corruption vitiates support for market and economic reform, 118 and – when it
officials sold government posts to junior officials who desired those positions because such
positions allowed them to extract bribes, thus perpetuating the entry into bureaucratic service of
dishonest and incapable persons and the exclusion of honest decisionmakers. Robert Wade, The
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accompanies democratic reform – perversely legitimizes the previous authoritarian regimes and
even creates a nostalgic longing for those regimes.119
Susan Rose-Ackerman powerfully summarizes the social affects of corruption:
“Corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, especially democracies . . . Citizens
may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder. Corruption
undermines claims that the government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on
ability to pay. It can lead to coups by undemocratic leaders.”120
3.5 Corruption Degrades Ukraine
Corruption has degraded Ukraine in each of these ways. Corruption clearly contributed
to disengagement by Ukrainians from the government and process of government.121 The
informal market surpassed the formal market in size.122 Corruption stalled or reversed economic
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growth and has left the energy sector in shambles.123 Foreign investors shunned Ukraine.124
Political leaders made patently bad decisions for very selfish reasons.125 Support for markets and
reforms diminished substantially, prior to the euphoria that accompanied the ouster of
Kuchma.126 Corruption has degraded the quality of life in Ukraine in countless ways.127
Attitudes in Ukraine toward corruption are complex, but in general people in Ukraine
condemn corruption.128 They should. As Martin Davies notes, “We delude ourselves if we think
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bribery to be purely economic conduct incapable of leading to fear, cruelty and humiliation.”129
The control of behaviors such as those engaged in by Lazarenko constitutes a matter of import to
the people of Ukraine, the United States, and the global community in general. Finding a means
of controlling the behaviors of transnational malfeasors, such as Pavlo Lazarenko, therefore
acquires special consequence.
4. United States v. Lazarenko: Decisions on Motions and a Verdict
Pavlo Lazarenko engaged in corrupt activity in Ukraine, while serving as a government
official, and then transferred the proceeds of that corrupt activity to several places outside of
Ukraine to hide and to launder. Because his actions crossed political borders, full criminal
prosecution of his acts would be unlikely in a system in which prosecuting governments
concerned themselves only with activities that occurred within their sovereign territory. Such a
construction essentially liberates a transnational actor such as Lazarenko from any constraints,
and fails to recognize the realities of transnational relationships.
A piece of Lazarenko’s activities occurred within the United States. Lazarenko allegedly
transferred more than one hundred million U.S. dollars through various U.S. banks;130 the fact
that this activity occurred within the United States gave U.S. prosecutors an opening. The
United States charged Pavlo Lazarenko with money laundering, wire fraud, transportation of
stolen property, and conspiracy.131
The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko is remarkable in a narrow sense as the first time the
United States has prosecuted a foreign leader in part for crimes committed in that leader’s
country.132 In a broader and more interesting sense the prosecution cobbles together local laws
to regulate transnational behavior. The process of cobbling together local laws to regulate
transnational actors raises several questions, ranging from the role and administration of those
local laws to the balancing of sovereignty. Indeed, the trial of Pavlo Lazarenko was delayed for
several years, in part because a number of the witnesses were abroad and not available but also in
part because of the complexity of the case.133 In the pre-trial stages, the Federal District Judge
issued two orders that illustrate the complexity of these issues and that merit scrutiny.
4.1 The First Order: The Role of Ukrainian Law
In response to differing postures adopted by the government and the defense, the court
asked for briefs and issued an order on the role of Ukrainian law in the prosecution of Lazarenko.
The government suggested that Ukrainian law should play only a limited role, whereas the
129
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defense argued that Ukrainian law played a central role. The court adroitly addressed the
relationship between the two sets of local laws with respect to money laundering and the
transportation of stolen property, but displayed far less care with respect to the issue of wire
fraud.
4.1.1. Money Laundering
The indictment charged Lazarenko with nine counts of money laundering. Money
laundering involves a downstream financial transaction intended to conceal the proceeds of a
known unlawful activity.134 The unlawful activities alleged by the government consisted of
foreign extortion, wire fraud, and receipt of stolen property. The charge of foreign extortion was
supported by 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), which listed at that time135 as predicate crimes “an
offense against a foreign nation involving . . . extortion.”136
The phrase “offense against a foreign nation” could be interpreted as meaning that the
foreign state must be the victim of the alleged act. In United States versus One 1997 E35 Ford
Van,137 however, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically
rejected such an interpretation, holding that it “would unduly limit the ability of the federal
government to prosecute those who launder money for the purpose of promoting serious criminal
activity in a foreign country.”138 Such an interpretation clearly comports with the general
understanding of crime as an offense against the state.139 The interpretation, however, also
134
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Constitution on Hobbes, Locke, Nozick, Rawls, and other political philosophers,
the theory is that we cede our right to exact revenge or restitution to the state and
to the law in return for the state's protection and enforcement of the law.
Accordingly, the state and federal governments of hold a formal constitutional
monopoly on the use of force. The criminal law, enacted by the legislatures, is

imposes on the prosecution the requirement of demonstrating that the underlying activity of the
defendant is in fact an offense against the state, that is, that it violates the laws of the country in
which it occurred. Indeed, in its order the District Court ordered that the prosecution had the
burden of proving that the extortive acts alleged to have been engaged in by Lazarenko violated
Ukrainian law.140 This order represents a significant cobbling together of local laws. The U.S.
District Court tried Lazarenko for violation of U.S. laws. However, because his actions were
transnational in nature, they involved the laws of another country. By joining together the two
sets of laws, the court devised a way to regulate a transnational act even in the absence of a
transnational authority.
4.1.2. Wire Fraud
The indictment of Lazarenko alleged twenty-two counts of wire fraud. Successful
prosecution of a wire fraud charge requires proof of “(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) use of the
wires in furtherance of the scheme, and (3) a specific intent to deceive or defraud.”141 A scheme
to defraud may include the deprivation of honest services,142 and the prosecution did allege that
Lazarenko deprived the Ukrainian people of honest services.
Prosecutor’s typically charge deprivation of honest services in cases of public
corruption.143 In spite of its frequent use, however, the statute allowing prosecution for
deprivation of honest services does not precisely define “honest services.”144 Nonetheless, to
part of that monopoly. Crimes are legally defined as offenses against the state and
the community, even if those offenses involve the individual victims.
Id.; see also MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 2 (1994) (the prevailing theory of criminal law is that crime is an
offense against the state); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal
Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1261 (1994) (same). Although much of this
literature is critical of the affects of this theory of crime, Miriam Aukerman points out that even
in different criminal justice paradigms, such as restorative justice, an important component of
crime is that it constitutes an offense against the rules and norms of a society. Miriam J.
Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional
Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 78 (2002)
140
United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *12 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003).
141
United States v. Garlick, 240 F. 3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001); see Skye Lynn Perryman, Mail
and Wire Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 715-38 (2006) (providing a comprehensive
overview of wire fraud).
142
18 U.S.C. §1346.
143
Adam Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 397 (1989).
144
See Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government's Authority to
Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions
and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 719 (2000) (referring to the phrase as “amorphous”).
Aphorisms such as Cervantes’ famous maxim “honesty is the best policy” do not help. MIGUEL
DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA pt. 2, book 3, ch. 33 (1615); see

borrow from a court’s examination of a slightly different relationship, the “language is no more
general than such terms as ‘due process,’ ‘seaworthiness,’ ‘equal protection of the law,’ ‘good
faith,’ or ‘restraint of trade,’ which courts interpret every day.”145 Indeed, courts have spent
several decades elucidating the phrase “honest services.”146
The majority of courts evaluating a claim of deprivation of honest services by a public
official apply a fairly broad definition involving a violation of the relationship between that
official and the public.147 Public officials inherently bear a responsibility to make decisions in
the public’s best interest and to disclose any conflict of interest in doing so.148 This duty “need
not be based upon the existence of some statute prescribing such a duty” because an official is a
“trustee for the citizens and the state . . . and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee,
e.g., honesty and loyalty.”149 Therefore, any “undisclosed, biased decision making for personal
gain, [regardless of] tangible loss to the public . . . constitutes a deprivation of honest
services.”150 As John Coffee notes, “[t]he key idea in this now sizable body of law is that a
public decision-maker must disclose any conflict of interest in a transaction or decision that
could result in personal gain to the decision-maker. In addition, any receipt of a gratuity may

Harold H. Punke, Honesty as the Best Policy, 41 J. PHIL. 141, 141 (1944) (critically examining
Cervantes’ statement).
145
Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d. 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 1003 (1975) (determining that the trust agreement between the United States and the United
Nations regarding the Trust Territories of the Pacific is not too vague); see infra note 201 and
accompanying text (using international trust agreements to illustrate the universal nature of the
concept).
146
The development of law regarding deprivation of honest services experienced a brief
interruption when the Supreme Court declined to find a cause of action in the wire fraud statute
for harm to intangible rights, stating “we read [the mail fraud statute] as limited in scope to the
protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it
has.” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). Congress promptly answered this
challenge, passing section 1346 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100690, 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (1988). The Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated: “This
section overturns the decision in McNally v. United States in which the Supreme Court held that
the mail and wire fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights. Under the amendment,
those statutes will protect any person’s intangible right to the honest services of another,
including the right of the public to the honest services of public officials. The intent is to
reinstate all of the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail and wire fraud statutes without
change.” 134 Cong. Rec. S17,376 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988).
147
See George D. Brown. Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials After
Sabri, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 403, 437 (2005) (“Lukis-Lopez dictates a broad reading of the term
honest services with respect to a public official”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets
Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (suggesting that the honest services provision
“depend[s] on the existence of a special relationship between the parties”).
148
United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997).
149
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363, rev’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
150
United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 1996).

also require disclosure, at least when the decision-maker possesses discretionary authority and
the payor has an incentive to influence the public official.”151
Some scholars criticize the phrase “honest services” as vague and imprecise.152 These
scholars question not only the constitutionality of an imprecise phrase – notwithstanding the
myriad general phrases interpreted by courts – but also whether it provides sufficient instruction
to public officials as to how they must act – or more precisely how they may not act.153 Related
to these concerns, one strand of cases, very thin but discernable, holds that deprivation of honest
services occurs only through violation of a specific law. According to this interpretation of
honest services, “a federal prosecutor must prove that conduct of a state official breached a duty
respecting the provision of services owed to the official’s employer under state law.”154
John Coffee, who himself has raised questions regarding vagueness, vigorously
condemns this approach to honest services.155 He points out that the requirement of a violation
of a law “could have a devastating impact on the public fiduciary context” and would overturn
the existing standards regarding honest services “because the common law has never developed a
substantial body of precedents dealing with the disclosure obligations of the public official.”156
The effect has even more profound effects in civil law systems, in which principles developed by
courts are respected but not codified as part of the law.157
Requirement of violation of a specific law vitiates comprehensive attempts to control
corruption. Corruption manifests itself in many forms.158 In general, corruption is the use or
151

John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 453 (1998).
152
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983) (stating that intangible
rights are too broad and suggesting that they be narrowed by statute); Peter J. Henning, Maybe It
Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 435, 440 (1995) (criticizing the statute as imprecise); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The
Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1181 (1997) (asking for “specific
federal legislation that closely defines prohibited conduct”).
153
See John C. Coffee. Jr., Does “Unlawful Mean “Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L. REV. 193, 207 (1991) (stating that the
vagueness of honest services raises constitutional question regarding notice and fairness);
Brown, supra note 147, at 473 (stating that the honest services statute does not provide precise
guidance to government actors).
154
United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997).
155
Coffee, supra note 152, at 447-54.
156
Id. at 453. Coffee points out that “the mail and wire fraud statutes were the principal vehicle
for the development of this law.” Id.
157
See Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, La nature du droit d'auteur: droit de propriete ou monopole?,
43 MCGILL L.J. 507, 534 (1998) (discussing and using court developed principles not codified in
French law).
158
See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978)
(discussing varieties of corruption); see also Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Revisiting Corrupt
Practices from a Market Perspective, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1998) (“Although
most, if not all, states confront corruption . . . , corrupt practices are extremely difficult to
define.”); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of

misuse of public office or trust for self rather than public interest.159 The specific iterations of
this concept probably defy statutory listing: the methods of abusing trust or office are as infinite
as the human mind.160 Therefore, to prosecute only those methods contained on a statutory list
would eviscerate the state’s ability to control abusive behavior and would give free reign to
creative corrupt officials.
Requiring violation of a specific law also confuses legal compliance with honesty. Lynn
Paine accurately describes the relationship between law and ethics as “dynamic and interrelated”
rather than as exactly correspondent or completely separate from one another.161 Paine suggests
that “in truth, the relationship between [legal behavior and ethical behavior] is in flux: the
prescriptions of law and the prescriptions of ethics . . . coincide to different degrees at different
times and in different societies.”162 To conflate “honest services” with simple obedience to a law
demeans the concept of honesty.163
The court hearing motions on Lazarenko’s prosecution recognized that misuse or abuse
of a Ukrainian office must be determined on Ukrainian terms.164 Unfortunately, in the
prosecution of Lazarenko the court ordered that “to prove honest services fraud, the government
must establish that Lazarenko’s conduct violated the local, state or common law of Ukraine, or
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 788, 798-805 (1985) (describing difficulties in creating a
specific list of corrupt acts).
159
See Saladin Al-Jurf, Citizens, National Governments, and International Financial
Institutions: Changing Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193, 196 (1999) (stating that the World Bank’s definition of corruption is “[t]he abuse of
public office for private gain”); David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing
Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719, 720 (1966) (Corruption is the “misuse of authority as a result of
considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary.”); Philip B. Heymann, Democracy
and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 323, 325 (1996) (describing “[c]orruption, as secretly
receiving private benefits to affect a decision that is supposed to be made in the interests of
others and uninfluenced by private gain. . . .”); Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967).
160
For this reason, Chief Justice Burger praised the mail fraud statute as a front-line defense
against new and evolving forms of fraud. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
161
Lynn Sharp Paine, Law, Ethics and Managerial Judgment, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 153, 165
(1994).
162
Id. Indeed, Paine notes that “law is most often a lagging indicator of social ethics.” Id. at 167.
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See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market
for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 275-76 (2005) (noting that the Security Exchange
Commission has adopted a simple definition of Rule 406, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2006), and
that “the Commission’s definition, tracking the language of the statute, directs that a corporate
code of ethics should promote ‘honest and ethical conduct’ and not simply compliance with the
law”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1283 (1995)
(warning of the danger of requiring legal compliance rather than honesty).
164
United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003); see Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 629 (2000) (observing that although a general
understanding of corruption exists, its local manifestations may vary).

that he knew others were doing so on his behalf.”165 In doing so, the court seems to abandon the
principle that “[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain
an unfair advantage by corrupting such a one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to
defraud.”166
The court’s reference to “common law” is puzzling but could have opened the door to a
more commonsense understanding of the responsibility of a public official. Ukraine is not a
common law country,167 a fact of which the court seemed aware.168 If one substitutes the word
“principles” for the phrase “common law,” the instructions of the court would makes more sense
and would also protect the relationship between government and the public. The court, however,
did not follow this more sensible path.
When cobbling together local laws to regulate transnationally corrupt behavior, a basic
question when examining allegedly corrupt acts in other countries should be whether the act is in
fact corrupt in that jurisdiction. That question, however, should start from the premise that
corruption consists of the misuse or abuse of power for personal gain, rather than the
misconception that corrupt acts must be found on a statutory checklist. George Brown professes
dismay that “an extraordinary range of corrupt practices, including but not limited to, various
forms of bribery and failure to disclose breaches of fiduciary duty have been construed to fit
within the concept of honest services.”169 To average citizens, of either the United States or
Ukraine, it would probably be far more astonishing if bribery or the breach of fiduciary duties
were not considered an abrogation of the honest services expected from a public official. To
construe the law in any other way would not give effect to the intentions of Congress, and would
sterilize the law.
4.1.3. Transportation of Stolen Property
The indictment also charged Lazarenko with twenty-three counts of interstate
transportation of stolen property.170 Successful prosecution of this charge requires proof of two
165

United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003). The court took an interesting journey to this conclusion. The court started
by acknowledging that the “fiduciary duty to disclose information the public would want to
know. . . is often defined by state and local ethics laws.” Id. at *21 (emphasis added). The court
then makes reference to a case, from another circuit, in which a court used a violation of local
law to support the finding of a breach of the fiduciary duty. Id. at *21 (citing United States v.
Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)). From this, the court concludes that the prosecution
must prove a violation of Ukrainian law. Id. at *22.
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Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
167
See Kim Ratushny, Toward the “Independence . . .of Judges” in Ukraine?, 62 SASK. L. REV.
567, 569-70 (1999) (noting that Ukraine is not a common law country and discussing differences
between common law and former socialist law systems).
168
See United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2003) (recognizing that Ukraine does not share a common law background
with the United States.
169
Brown, supra note 147, at 437.
170
The criminalization of the interstate transportation has special relevance to the regulation and
control of corrupt activities that cross national borders. The Supreme Court of the United States

elements: (a) that the property in question was stolen, converted, or taken by fraud,171 and (b)
transportation of that property over a state line.172 Curiously, the word stolen “has no accepted
common law meaning.”173 Rather than relying on a common law meaning, courts instead look to
the purpose and intent of a statute containing the word “stolen,”174 although the United States
Supreme Court notes that “through the years, [‘stolen’] became the generic designation for
dishonest acquisition” of property.175
observed that the purpose of such legislation is to reach malfeasors who might otherwise escape
prosecution simply by crossing a border. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384 (1946)
(the legislation “contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing
criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate
commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive
processes impotent”).
171
Because the statute requires knowledge rather than belief of theft or fraud, theft or fraud must
actually have occurred. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV.
463, 541 (1992) (“When a legal standard requires knowledge, not simply belief, then the
standard imposes an additional non-mens rea requirement, namely, that the proposition believed
is true. This is simply an explication of the concept of knowledge. For example, to be guilty of
the crime of knowingly receiving stolen property, one must believe that the property is stolen,
and the property must indeed be stolen. But the mental state is essentially the same whether or
not the property is actually stolen.”).
172
18 U.S.C. § 2314; see Jorge C. Gonzalez, Punishing the Causer as the Principal: Mens Rea
and the Interstate Transportation Element of the National Stolen Property Act, 38 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 629, 629 (2001) (discussing and defining the elements of the crime). Courts do not concern
themselves over the defendant’s knowledge regarding the transportation of the property. See
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970) (“Section 2314 is aimed at the evils
of theft, fraud, and counterfeiting and not at the regulation of interstate transportation.”). Rather,
the critical element is the defendant’s knowledge of the theft, conversion or fraud and the fact
that theft, conversion or fraud did occur. See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The
Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1341, 1386 (2002). Weiss notes that “the strict liability element is the element conferring
federal jurisdiction – converting a state offense into a federal offense. This sort of jurisdictional
element is typically a strict liability element. The jurisdictional element is usually one of strict
liability, precisely because it is not what makes the conduct criminal, but rather what makes it
criminal under federal, rather than only state, law.” Id. at 1387.
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United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); see Jonathan S. Moore, Note, Enforcing
Foreign Ownership Claims In The Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 473 (1988) (reporting
that Turley promotes an expansive definition of ownership and suggesting that an expansive
definition is particularly appropriate when considering ownership and theft in the context of
multiple jurisdictions).
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Turley, 352 U.S. at 413 (directing courts to “give ‘stolen’ the meaning consistent with the
context in which it appears”); see Susan E. Brabenec, The Art of Determining “Stolen Property:”
United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by Egon Schiele, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1369, 1393
(2001) (stating that Turley asks courts to look at the intent and purpose of statutes using the term
“stolen”).
175
Turley, 352 U.S. at 412.

Placing the meaning of “stolen” within the context of the federal statute in which it
appears gives the word the color of federal law. Indeed, the court hearing motions in
Lazarenko’s case ruled that “federal law controls the question of whether an item is ‘stolen.’”176
The court also noted, however, that a determination of theft depended on a property interest.
Finding a property interest becomes interesting when cobbling together local laws.
As Emmanuel Kant noted, “the origin of ownership is difficult to comprehend.”177
Nonetheless, while an inchoate natural right to property may exist,178 law gives expression to the
right and ability to own property.179 Thus, the law determines what is owned and what is
stolen.180 Because laws and legal systems differ, however; what a person can own and how
ownership is perfected or violated vary from place to place.181
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Ownership: Kant’s Theory of Property in his Doctrine of Right, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 217, 217
(2006) (quoting Emmanuel Kant: “Der Anfang des Eigentums ist schwer zu begreifen”).
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O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 461 (2004) (describing natural law
theory of property); see also Karen Clay & Gavin Wright, Order Without Law? Property Rights
During the California Gold Rush, 42 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 155, 159-163 (2005)
(describing the creation of property rights in the legal vacuum of California gold rush).
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to own property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357-58 (2001) (describing a predominant theory of property:
“Property is a composite of legal relations that holds between persons . . .”). Merrill and Smith
suggest two competing theories of property, both of which depend on law. Merrill & Smith,
supra, at 397-98.
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See Merrill & Smith, supra note 179, at 362 (“property is important because it gives legal
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marauders, pilferers and thieves”).
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See HIROYUKI YANAGIHASHI, HISTORY OF THE EARLY ISLAMIC LAW OF PROPERTY:
RECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT, 7TH-9TH CENTURIES (2006) (describing different
property system); Lord Hope of Craighead, The Place of a Mixed System in the Common Law
World, 35 ISR. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001) (noting that common and civil law differ markedly in the
perfection of property rights); George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating
Charges and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307, 310 (2003) (describing property law as
“fragmented” between nations); Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property
and Community in Brazil and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 474 (2006)
(observing that property laws and societal goals regarding property differ in different
jurisdictions); Michael J. Whincop, Conflicts in the Cathedral: Towards a Theory of Property
Rights in International Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 41, 46 (2000) (noting that property laws differ
among jurisdictions).

The Lazarenko court recognized the local nature of property. Thus, even while
recognizing that U.S. federal law governs “stolen,” the court ruled that Ukrainian law mattered
with respect to property rights.182 Again, in cobbling together a means of reaching a
transnational actor, the court adroitly joined together two sets of local laws.
4.1.4. Finding Fact and Finding Law
The consistent reference to Ukrainian law left one last question in the proceeding. The
court ruled that it, as the determiner of law, would rule on the content of Ukrainian law and that
the jury, as trier of fact, would pass verdict on whether Lazarenko had violated that law. 183
Phrased so starkly, it is difficult to gainsay that allocation of responsibilities.184 Moreover, it is
singularly unremarkable for U.S. courts, or any domestic court, to rule on the content of another
country’s laws.185 Such determinations are made as a matter of course.186 The fact that law may
change rapidly and unpredictably in an emerging economy may make this task difficult, but
difficulty does not relieve a court of its responsibilities.187
4.2 The Second Order: Dismissing Charges
Immediately following the prosecution’s presentation of its case in chief, the defense
moved for dismissal of the charges on the (predictable) grounds that the prosecution had failed to
produce evidence to support the charges. The court granted this motion in part and denied in
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(2007) (stating that judges find law and juries find fact); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role
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Study in Private international Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 225 (1995) (“Application,
proof, and interpretation of foreign law are interrelated subjects that sit at the core of
international conflict of laws, or, as known in the civil law system, private international law.”);
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 293 n.175 (1990) (“The
power of parties to rely on foreign law with respect to interpreting their contract is
uncontroversial.”).
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See Dolinger supra note 185, at 230-32 (noting that France, for example, litigates extensive
amounts of foreign law in its courts).
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See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1170 (1999) (stating that the proper question is not
whether the task is difficult but instead whether the task is beyond the court’s competence).
Specifically in reference to discerning international customary law, Judge Edwards stated: “That
the task might be difficult should in no way lead to the conclusion that it should not be
accomplished.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).

part.188 While the granting of a motion to dismiss rarely elicits notice, this particular order
highlights the serious problems created by this court’s attenuated definition of honest services.
The wire fraud case forced upon the prosecution by that definition did not simply involve
deprivation of honest services but instead demanded proof of violation of a specific provision of
the Ukrainian Commercial Code.189 This provision requires an official act, taken for mercenary
gain, contrary to the interest of service, which causes material harm.190 The affects of this very
strange use of a statute illustrate the problems caused when officials are asked to comply with a
statutory list rather than held to a standard of honesty.191
The court dismissed several charges against Lazarenko because in its mind “[t]he
government [] utterly failed[ed] to establish material harm.”192 While this conclusion may make
sense in the context of section 1665 of the Ukrainian Commercial Code, it sounds bizarre
juxtaposed against the mountain of empirical evidence condemning corruption as utterly
harmful.193 Lazarenko diverted nearly a billion dollars into his own pocket, he and his cronies
savaged the energy market in Ukraine, he stunted the development of the industries from which
he extorted goods and monies, and he and his cronies contributed to a sense of despair and
futility throughout the country.194 In every sense of the phrase other than, perhaps, that
extrapolated from a provision of the Commercial Code, Pavlo Lazarenko deprived the citizens of
Ukraine of honest services, a deprivation for which they suffered.
The court’s reliance on a specific, obscure statutory provision is also troubling because it
displays both legal ignorance and cultural arrogance. First, the court ignores the fact that
tribunals in civil law countries use principles just as much as tribunals in common law
countries.195 Indeed, the principles of honeste vivere, suum cuique tribuere, and alterum non
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effect on January 1, 2004 after several years of drafting).
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United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19660, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 7, 2004).
191
See United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the mere
acts of bribery or kickbacks are sufficient to demonstrate deprivation of honest services).
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United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19660, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 7, 2004).
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See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
194
Ukraine’s gross domestic product in 2000 equaled US$ 44.5 billion, making Lazarenko’s
heist equal to about two percent of the entire country’s product.
195
See ATHANASSIOS N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
LAW 96 (2d. ed., 1999) (“ in civil law countries judges and lawyers alike start their judicial
reasoning from statutes as embodying general principles capable of covering any conceivable
fact situation”); Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 910-911 (1999) (discussing the inevitability of a
body of unofficial precedence in civil law countries).

laedere are foundational in civil legal systems.196 Peter Lindseth succinctly explains the use of
principles in civil law systems:
Codes can be notoriously vague – the French tort provisions are the favorite
example of teachers of comparative law – requiring extensive judicial elaboration.
The current meaning of French tort law has much more to do with well-settled
precedent – la jurisprudence constante; e.g. relating to strict products liability –
than the Code’s original references to delictual responsibility for “une faute.”
Codes must also be, by definition, sufficiently general to handle a variety of
unforeseen circumstances (“feconde en ses consequences,” as the French put it).
Therefore, the prevailing method of interpretation, to use your terminology, is
purposive and dynamic (the so-called “teleological method of interpretation”).197
To assume that a Ukrainian court faced with the question “did Pavlo Lazarenko deprive our
citizens of honest services” would rely on an obscure provision from the Ukrainian Commercial
Code is patently ludicrous.198 Sadly, the court was forced into that corner by its own
misinterpretation of “honest services.”
The court’s finding of no material harm also borders on cultural arrogance. The finding
implies at least the possibility that the relationship between the Ukrainian government and
Ukrainian peoples is somehow lower in nature than a similar relationship in a common law
jurisdiction. This is not true. Ndiva Kofele-Kale artfully demonstrates the existence of a general
duty of care by public officials to the public.199 He explains that
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Live honestly, do not hurt others, and give to each their due. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 1.1; see
Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 310-11 (1998) (“In my
judgment, the principles of mutual respect and cooperation for the common good underlie the
entire Civil Code. I think of them as being the essence of what Justinian meant by his first
precept of the law, honeste vivere . . .”); Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a
Comparative Law Perspective, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 521,533 (2004) (referring to honeste
vivere, suum cuique tribuere, and alterum non laedere as “fundamental” principles of civil law
systems); see also Judith K. Schafer, “Details of a Most Revolting Character”: Cruelty to
Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1283, 1301
(1993) (referring to civil law case in which honeste vivere was incorporated by the court into
duties of a manager (Dwyer v. Cane, 6 La. Ann. 707, 707 (1851)).
197
E-mail letter from Peter Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal Studies Center,
Columbia University, to Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University (Apr. 14,
1998), quoted in Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 236
(1998).
198
See Natalie Prescott, Note, Orange Revolution in Red, White, and Blue: U.S. Impact on the
2004 Ukrainian Election, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 240-41 (2006) (reporting the use of
principles and movements toward the informal use of stare decisis and other aspects of common
law in Ukraine).
199
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous
Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 48, 95-101 (1995).

an important distinction can be drawn between leaders holding public office and
the citizens they serve. Political leaders hold greater power and, therefore, bear
far greater moral responsibility than ordinary citizens. A state’s wealth and
resources are passed down to the citizens and political leaders as the natural
legacy from previous generations. Accordingly, a state’s wealth and resources are
to be held in trust for the present generation of citizens and for those not yet
born.200
Kofele-Kale points out that the concept of trust has international recognition, regardless of the
system of law, as evidenced by the responsibilities allocated by the United Nations through its
International Trusteeship System.201 It is true that in common law jurisdictions the trust
relationship often uses the specialized nomenclature of “fiduciary duties,” but the lack of the
term fiduciary does not mean that other systems do not impose similar duties.202
Ukrainians in specific also consider the relationship between public officials and the
public to carry with it duties and standards of care. The Constitution of Ukraine requires each
incoming Deputies to swear an oath to “execute my duties in the interests of all fellow
countrymen.”203 Surveys conducted in Ukraine find that Ukrainians consider freedom from
corruption an important aspect of democracy, and find disappointment with corrupt officials.204
The tens of thousands of persons who bore the privations of Ukraine’s winter to protest Leonid
Kuchma’s corruption each bear witness to the fact that Ukraine society, just as that of the United
States, places a duty on public officials that includes honesty and fair dealing. To say that
Lazarenko did not deprive the people of Ukraine of honest services is to engage in the most
incapacious of reasoning.
*****
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Id. at 97.
Id. at 100-101. In the case of Lazarenko, he would be found to violate the basic “public trust
doctrine . . . that the state owes its citizens special duties of care, or stewardship, with respect to
certain ‘common property’ public resources that comprise the wealth of the state.” Id. at 96.
202
See Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Socialist
Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 156-157 (1993)
(discussing analogs to fiduciary responsibilities in socialist legal systems); Mark J. Roe, Legal
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 466-67 (2006)
(recognizing differences between common law fiduciary principles and civil law systems, but
stating that civil law does many of the same things – “they’re just not labeled as fiduciary
duties”).
203
UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA (constitution) ch. IV, art. 79 (Ukr.), available in English at
http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/conste.html. Ukraine adopted its constitution in 1996, shortly
before Lazarenko took office as Prime Minister. See generally Richard C.O. Rezie, Note, The
Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens’ Rights Provisions, 31 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 169, 169-210 (1999) (discussing and explaining the Constitution of Ukraine).
204
RAKESH SHARMA, ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 4-5 (2003).
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The jury heard the defense’s case on the charges that were not dismissed. The jury
convicted Pavlo Lazarenko on all counts.205 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit dismissed Lazarenko’s appeal, sentenced Lazarenko to serve nine years in prison, and
fined him ten million U.S. dollars.206 The conviction of one of the most avaricious of former
leaders of a country signals the possibility of a potent new tool in the effort to combat corruption.
It also demonstrates the need for, and the difficulty in, cobbling together local laws to reach
transnational actors.
5. Cobbling Together Local Laws in a Sovereign World
The acts that lead to Lazarenko’s conviction occurred in part while he sat as the Prime
Minister of Ukraine. His prosecution and conviction inevitably lead to questions about
sovereignty. “Sovereignty” is a phrase at least as abused and maligned as “globalization.”
Although the term elicits frequent invocation and engenders regular debate, no clear definition of
sovereignty exists.207 Broadly, the term sovereignty conveys a degree of independence and selfdetermination, but even this usage encompasses a wide number of usages.208
Stephen Krasner groups the many uses of the term into four basic categories: domestic
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian
sovereignty.209 Domestic sovereignty refers to the amount of authority and control a polity has
within its own political organization and how that authority is manifested and organized – how
effective the polity is as a state.210 Interdependence authority refers to the amount of control that
205

WILSON, supra note 60, at 40.
United States v. Lazarenko, 469 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2006) amended, rehearing denied,
rehearing en banc denied, United States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2612 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2007).
207
As Oppenheim noted more than a century ago, “[t]here exists perhaps no conception the
meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that
this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present
day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.” 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1905); see also Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and its Relevance to
Native Americans in the Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487 (1998/1999)
(“Despite its fundamental nature, however, there is no commonly accepted definition of
sovereignty.”).
208
See Hannum, supra note 207, at 487 (“sovereignty may be understood as constitutional or
legal independence”);
209
Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED
RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001).
210
Id. at 7-8. In the United Sates, for example, ultimate authority lies with the people, who
delegate that authority to a system of government divided into three branches. See Bruce G.
Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM.
U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (stating that the people are the sovereign, noting confusion around the
delegation of their sovereign powers, but finding that “[t]he separation of powers operates in a
more apparent and specific way at what we might identify as a level of ‘fundamental
sovereignty.’”). Domestic sovereignty has no dispositive role in other types of sovereignty: a
lack of effectiveness would not render a state as something other than a state. Krasner points out
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a state has over transborder movement.211 International legal sovereignty refers to the
recognition of a state by other states or international actors.212 What Krasner calls Westphalian
sovereignty is the most problematic: it holds that states are independent and autonomous and
that “external authority structures should be excluded from the territory of a state.”213
The criticism of most legal scholars is leveled at Westphalian sovereignty;214 indeed,
most legal scholarship does not contemplate the other uses of the term sovereign. This usage of
the term “sovereignty” engenders a criticism very similar to that of international law: that it does
not describe the world as it actually exists.215 As David Kennedy points out, states have always

that “failed states” still act as states within the international system and are still accorded the
dignity of a state by other states. Krasner, supra note 209, at 7.
211
Krasner, supra note 209, at 8-9. Many legal scholars offer control of borders as a
foundational aspect of sovereignty, although usually in the context of discussions involving
immigration. See JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF
IMMIGRATION REFORM 5 (1999) (arguing that control of borders is a fundamental aspect of
sovereignty); James A. Casey, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 419 (1994) (supporting fundamental notion that
sovereignty controls borders); Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1087, 1105 (1993) (noting the “basic right” of a sovereign to control its
borders); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6
(1984) (control of borders is inherent in sovereignty). Of course, states that do not have
significant levels of control over transborder movement can still hold the status of a state.
Lichtenstein, for example, acts as a state even though it has ceded control of its borders to
Switzerland.
212
Krasner, supra note 209, at 9-10. The Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that recognition as a
state is independent of other types of sovereignty. Jilani v. Government of Punjab, 1972 P.L.D.
S. Ct. 139, 181 (Pakistan) (Hamoodur Rahman, C.J.) (“The recognition of a State under
International Law has nothing to do with the internal sovereignty of the State . . .”); see Thomas
D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
869, 875 (2000) (“A government is not a State.”). Alexander Aleinikoff, however, refutes
Krasner’s distinctions between types of sovereignty, arguing that “[t] his ‘external’ sovereignty,
based as it is on a norm of noninterference, depends upon the existence and well functioning of
an international regime of states with the power to recognize those entities whose sovereignty
must be respected and to maintain order within the regime.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary
International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 104 n.84 (2004).
213
Krasner, supra note 209, at 10-12; see Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole:
Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2004)
(expounding upon concept of Westphalian sovereignty); Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not
Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 651 (1997) (same).
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See, e.g., Ian Ward. The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091
(2003); see also David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 417 (1994) (providing a list of alternative and critical
scholarship).
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See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

yielded to some degree of external authority.216 Indeed, the very concept of jus cogens –
peremptory norms that bind a state because the norm is peremptory rather than because the state
has consented to those norms217 – suggests the fallaciousness of this articulation of
sovereignty.218 Nonetheless, the Westphalian conception of sovereignty retains vitality in
international law and merits attention. The prosecution of Paulo Lazarenko possibly challenges
Westphalian sovereignty in two ways: first by breaching sovereign immunity, and second by
imperialistically imposing the values of one polity on another.
5.1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
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David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 353,
361 (1980) (noting that States “cannot be both internally absolute and externally social”).
217
The Vienna Convention memorializes the principle of jus cogens:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344; see
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional
Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 801-09
(1990) (discussing at length the principles of jus cogens). National and international tribunals
use the concept regularly. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006)
(reversing dismissal of a complaint because, among other things, the district court did not
properly consider jus cogens); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, Nos. 04-CV-5564 (NG)(VVP), 05CV-0388 (NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5826, at *52 (E.D. NY Jan. 29, 2007) (discussing
jus cogens in context of financing of terrorist acts); Juridical Condition and Rights of the
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, para. 101 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Sept. 17,
2003) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/juris_ing/index.html (finding that principles of
equality and nondiscrimination enjoy the status of jus cogens).
218
See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1988) (“Jus cogens is
capable of invalidating not only conflicting rules drawn from treaties but also rules that would
otherwise be part of customary international law.”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for
International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 67 (1996) (“a
jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other norms and principles”);
David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian law as a Norm of Jus
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 228 (2005) (“Peremptory
norms represent the top of the international legal hierarchy and take precedence over national
law at the international level and other sources of international law.”).

Lazarenko’s actions occurred while he occupied a role in the Ukrainian government, and
therefore introduces the possibility that he deserves “the exemption of the person of the
sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.”219 Lazarenko in the specific could
not avail himself of immunity because both the United States and Ukraine favored his
prosecution.220 Nonetheless, in general the prosecution of bureaucrats in foreign jurisdictions
raises questions regarding foreign sovereign immunity.
Foreign sovereign immunity finds its roots in hoary concepts of sovereignty.
Technically, the maxim rex non potest peccarre221 applies to the King only within his own
jurisdiction. Under the Westphalian idealization of sovereignty, however, all sovereigns are
equal and inviolate.222 Therefore, if the sovereign is immune within its own jurisdiction, then
equality requires immunity for all sovereigns – par in parem imperium non habet.223 Because in
hoary times the sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity, equality required that foreign sovereigns
also enjoy absolute immunity.224 Thus, when Justice Marshall introduced foreign sovereign
immunity into U.S. jurisprudence in The Schooner Exchange, he described that immunity in
absolutist terms.225
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The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); see Peter J.
Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2003)
(discussing Schooner Exchange and the development of the foreign sovereign immunities
doctrine in the United States).
220
Cf. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying claim of foreign
sovereign immunity because the United States sought prosecution and Panama declined to
request immunity), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1060 (1998).
221
The King can do no wrong. See William R. Dorsey, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 257 (1997).
222
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
223
An equal has no dominion over an equal. See Manooher Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and the “Commercial Activity” Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and
Practice, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 95, 97 n.10 (1999); see also THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1970)
(reciting this history of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity).
224
See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY i (1963)
(discussing the breadth of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity at its earliest inception).
225
See Mofidi, supra note 223, at 96-99 (discussing The Schooner Exchange). Michael Murray
convincingly demonstrates that Marshall did not in fact lay out a doctrine of absolute immunity
and that courts following The Schooner Exchange had some latitude. Michael D. Murray,
Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi War Crimes of Plunder and
Exploitation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 228-29 (2003). Nonetheless, it cannot be
gainsaid that the bulk of courts listening to Marshall’s absolutist language felt compelled to
apply a doctrine of absolute immunity. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 3 n.12 (1988) (listing cases adhering to an absolute
theory of immunity attributed to The Schooner Exchange).

For many years courts applied foreign sovereign immunity in absolutist terms.226 Cracks
began to appear as the commercial activities of states rose in prominence and in value.227
Indeed, the specter of absolute immunity from suit for commercial activities led most countries
to the creation and application of a relative doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.228 Having
opened the door to prosecution of claims based on the commercial activities of sovereigns,
prosecution soon became available for claims of violation of jus cogens, of human rights, and a
growing list of other issues.229
This mutability of foreign sovereign immunity more accurately reflects its historical
application than does a stylized Westphalian vision. Foreign sovereign immunity has never been
226

E.g., Berizzi Brothers Company v. The Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (applying
immunity to political and commercial actions); Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n, 2 K.B. 1003. 1013
(1951) (applying absolute immunity); see SWEENEY, supra note 224, at 20-21 (discussing the
early application of absolute immunity in Europe).
227
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326-27 (4th ed. 1990)
(stating that the absolute doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity prevailed until the rise in state
commercial activity in the early twentieth century); Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign”
Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial
Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 497 (1992) (“[T]he enormous expansion in
international commerce meant that most foreign state immunity cases concerned trading
activities and contractual obligations, not royalty and their ships, diminishing the persuasiveness
of ‘dignity’ as a rationale for foreign state immunity.”). The musings of Lord Maugham
represent typical concerns of that era: “Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom
embarked in trade with ordinary ships . . . but there has been a very large development of Stateowned commercial ships since the Great War, and the question whether the immunity should
continue to be given to ordinary trading ships has become acute.” Compania Naviera
Vascongado v The Cristina, [1938] AC 485, 521 (Lord Maugham).
228
See SWEENEY, supra note 224, at 21 (discussing the causal relationship between state
commercial activity and the application of relative immunity in Europe); Ved P. Nanda, Human
Rights and Sovereign Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and
Diplomatic Immunity) – Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 470 (1999)
(discussing the commercial exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity).
229
See Andrea Bianchi, International Decisions: Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 242 (2005) (discussing Italian and Greek cases that limit the application of
foreign sovereign immunity when violations of jus cogens are alleged); Harlan Grant Cohen,
Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 273, 319 (2006) (stating that war crimes and heinous acts are not protected by foreign
sovereign immunity); Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of
International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 513-515 (2003) (discussing
statutes in several countries that exempt certain behaviors from foreign sovereign immunity);
Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party
States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 378-79 (2001) (“Further, it is now generally accepted that state
officials are not protected from criminal prosecution by the doctrines of foreign sovereign
immunity or head of state immunity when they commit international crimes such as genocide or
crimes against humanity, since these are acts which cannot be properly considered as the official
functions of a State.”).

a requirement imposed on nations;230 at most it is a broad principle of customary international
law231 applied in domestic courts as “a matter of grace and comity.”232 Foreign sovereign
immunity is not memorialized in any widely accepted treaty. The Brussels Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels233 contains some
provisions relating to sovereign immunity (for the most part limiting immunity) but was signed
by fewer than twenty-five countries.234 Similarly, the European Convention on State
Immunity235 has not been signed by the majority of European nations and it too limits rather than
expounds sovereign immunity.236 The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property237 has opened for signature but has not yet entered into force; it too
limits sovereign immunity.238
Foreign sovereign immunity does manifest itself as an articulated statute in the laws of
most countries.239 From Canada to South Africa, from Pakistan to Singapore, each of these acts
230

See James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J.
INT’L L. 820, 820 (1981) (“Indeed, it has been denied that there is any international law rule at
all on the subject, a view that would presumably leave each state free to formulate, or negotiate,
its own rule.”).
231
See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH L REV. 2129, 2161-61 (1999) (stating that customary international law is the
source of foreign sovereign immunity); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1839 (1998) (attributing origins of foreign sovereign immunity
to customary international law). Patrick McFadden points out inconsistencies in its local
application that call into question foreign sovereign immunity’s status as customary international
law. Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 59
n.258 (1995).
232
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); see Lee M. Caplan, The
Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 389 (2001) (“While the
Supreme Court has constitutionalized the law of jurisdiction over persons and property, it has
always treated the law of jurisdiction over foreign states and their property as a matter of
customary international law.”).
233
Brussels Convention of 1926 for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of
State-Owned Vessels, Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199.
234
See Robert Franck, The New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. REV. 308, 308-09 (1926) (discussing
the convention); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest of State-Owned
Ships: The Need for an Admiralty Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1274,
1286-89 (1983) (discussing the convention).
235
European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, ETS No. 74, reprinted in 11 ILM
470 (1972).
236
See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 757 (2003) (discussing the convention).
237
GA Res. 59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004).
238
David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 194 (2005).
239
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 cmt. a
(1987); see ANDREW DICKINSON, RAE LINDSAY & JAMES P. LOONOM, STATE IMMUNITY:

embraces a relative rather than absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity.240 The corpus of
state laws, together with the skeletal body of treaty, clearly indicates that to the extent
international custom with respect to sovereign immunity exists, that custom expresses itself as a
relative doctrine.
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, therefore, does not constitute a barrier to the
prosecution of foreign officials for corruption. Legal scholars have already engaged in the
debate regarding the prosecution of sovereign agents for human rights violations;241 the
expansion of their thinking to include corruption represents only an incremental change. Foreign
sovereign immunity is at most a matter of comity between states, and as such it imposes a
requirement of communication between states, of a coordination of judicial goals and foreign
relations objectives, and of a balancing of values, rules and fairness.242 The fact that this task is
difficult does not mean that it is impossible, nor does it excuse courts from its undertaking.243
SELECTED MATERIAL AND COMMENTARY (2004) (providing legislation on sovereign immunity);
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UN Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B/20
(1982) (providing legislative material on sovereign immunity).
240
See Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798
(1982) and South African Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1981, Pakistani State Immunity
Ordinance of 1981, Singaporean State Immunity Act of 1979, each reprinted in UNITED
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND
THEIR PROPERTY 20, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.V.10 (1982).
241
Compare Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403 (1995)
(suggesting that violations of jus cogens trumps application of foreign sovereign immunity) with
Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus Cogens – Some
Critical Remarks, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433 (1995) (disagreeing with Reimann on policy
grounds).
242
Joseph Glannon and Jeffery Atik are confident that US federal courts, for example, will craft
rules that are fair and that comport both with the dictates of international law and the goals of the
domestic polity. They suggest that
courts will likely impose limits on jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns similar to
those imposed by the due process clause, as a matter of federal common law, so
long as the [domestic legislation] does not clearly contemplate wider jurisdiction.
However, once the political branches expressly authorize wider jurisdiction, these
court-imposed limits will be superseded by their exercise of the foreign affairs
power.
Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of
Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J.
675, 696-97 (1999).
243
See Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term – Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes
– Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 82 (1960) (noting that courts have a
“great and difficult task in our constitutional system of government”); Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation in a Liberal State The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1550
n.53 (1983) (noting that courts commonly undertake very difficult tasks).

5.2. Relativity and Imperialism
Criminal prosecution in one country for acts committed outside its borders sometimes
raises questions of relativity, on the theory that conduct prohibited by the prosecuting country
may be countenanced by the country in which the act occurred.244 The extraterritorial
prosecution of corruption in particular has raised claims of cultural and legal imperialism.245
Indeed, Steve Salbu claims that imperialism is “an ineluctable reality” of the prosecution of
extraterritorial corruption.246 Salbu, and others, argue that behaviors considered acceptable or
even desirable by one culture might be considered corrupt by another, and that to impose one
value system on another constitutes legal imperialism.247
The fact that every country in the world criminalizes corruption248 confounds a claim of
legal imperialism. The routine extension of criminal rules across borders also diminishes the
impact of a claim of legal imperialism. From accounting and financial misconduct249 to terrorist
acts,250 from sex tourism251 to elusion of taxes,252 a variety of statutes around the world allow for
244

See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational
Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (1995) (noting criticism).
245
See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights: The Dialectic of the
Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 496 (1999) (stating that international anti-corruption
efforts are “elitist, statist and Eurocentric”); David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption
Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 458 (1999) (stating that the anti-corruption regimes have
overtones of colonialism); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 239 (1997) (stating that
“efforts to control bribery in other nations constitute moral imperialism”).
246
Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the
Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 252 (1999).
247
See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 611-15 (2000) (discussing the
anecdotal, but persistent belief that corruption is accepted in some places).
248
See id. at 613 (noting that corruption is illegal everywhere).
249
See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728, 761 (1987) (stating that
British courts will give extraterritorial effect to a foreign court order dealing with the
international financial regime); Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving
the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1162, 1269-75 (1987) (describing
extraterritorial financial regulations).
250
See Madeline Morris, Terrorism: The Politics of Prosecution, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 405, 407
(2005) (“State-sponsored terrorism has led logically to an impetus toward some form of
supranational or extraterritorial authority for the handling of terrorist offenses.”); Ralph Wilde,
Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 740-52 (describing a great number of extraterritorial
provisions dealing with terrorism and noting that they are “nothing new”).
251
Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition Under the
Canadian Charter, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 220 n.371 (1998) (describing Canadian
extraterritorial laws to combat sexual exploitation of children); Nancy Beyer, Note, The Sex
Tourism Industry Spreads to Costa Rica and Honduras: Are These Countries Doing Enough to

criminal prosecution of extraterritorial acts. Indeed, customary international law has for
centuries recognized the universal jurisdiction of local courts to prosecute certain behaviors
wherever those behaviors occurred, including piracy, slavery and war crimes.253 Clearly, the
simple act of prosecuting extraterritorial actors or conduct does not always or even often raise
concerns of legal imperialism.
The case at hand, however, does not involve a bad accountant or a sex tourist. Rather, it
involves a foreign leader engaged in the process of rebuilding a country following a couple of
centuries of occupation and the dismantling of many of the local institutions. Lazarenko’s
defense hints at accusations of imperialism; he claims that he engaged in these behaviors at a
time when Ukraine was relatively lawless and freewheeling.
The fact a statute makes a particular act illegal does not necessarily mean that the polity
prosecutes that act.254 Many countries formally recognize “prosecutorial discretion”; by any
name the choices a polity makes regarding prosecution give effect to the norms of a society.255
In the United States, for example, various state laws technically criminalize many forms of social
interaction: kissing other than in marriage, most forms of sexual contact, underage consumption
Protect Their Children from Sexual Exploitation?, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 301, 327 (2001)
(reporting that more than twenty countries extraterritorially prosecute sexual exploitation of
children); Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds That Congress Can Regulate Sex Crimes
Committed by U.S. Citizens Abroad – United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 119
HARV. L. REV. 2612, 2614 (2006) (reporting a holding that extraterritorial application of laws
protecting children from sexual exploitation are legitimate).
252
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (stating that extraterritorial
taxation is “universally recognized” and noting it is “inseparable from responsibility for sharing
the costs of government”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Cade as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 375, (2006) (noting the legality of extraterritorial taxation); Gerald L. Neuman,
Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
378 (1987) (“The grant of some extraterritorial taxing authority to local governments is hardly a
novelty.”).
253
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (ed. Stephen Macedo, 2004); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal
Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988), see also Henry A. Kissinger,
The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, 80 FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2001.
254
See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
791 (2006) (“Laws need not be regularly enforced.”).
255
See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280, 2293 (2006) (“Prosecutorial discretion requires policy determinations about how best to
implement a statutory program.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 97 (1985) (“What cases are important enough
to pursue entails policy discretion of the broadest sort. When to withhold remedial sanctions or
alternatively to make an example of some offender raises issues of basic moral and political
values.”); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717 (1996) (describing breadth and policy implications of prosecutorial discretion); Stuntz, supra
note 254, at 791 (“Prosecutorial discretion is, if anything, even broader.”).

of alcohol, and so on.256 These behaviors are rarely prosecuted. Indeed, extensive prosecution
likely would result in social unrest.257 Arguably, societies exist in which corruption is illegal but
no one anticipates its prosecution. Extraterritorial prosecution, therefore, would constitute some
degree of encroachment.
The overwhelming mass of evidence suggests that prosecution of corrupt acts does not
constitute imperialism. Each of the major religions or schools of moral thought condemn
corruption: including Buddhism,258 Christianity,259 Confucianism,260 Hinduism,261 Islam,262
256

See 18 PA CONS. STAT. § 1301 (defining many types of sexual contact as criminal); Sara Sun
Beale, From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 747, 752 (2005)
(“Approximately one fourth of the states, and the District of Columbia, retain laws making
fornication and cohabitation a crime, and about half of the states, and the military, make adultery
a crime.”); Peter Goodrich, The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the Governance of
Kissing, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 185-98 (1998) (discussing numerous laws
affecting social interaction); Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking: Does Current Policy
Make Sense?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333 (2006) (discussing the relationship between
enforcement of drinking age laws and social policy).
257
See Kit Lively, At Michigan State, A Protest Escalated into a Night of Fires, Tear Gas, and
Arrests, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at A46 (describing a riot by more than 3,000
college students protesting enforcement of alcohol laws); Leo Reisberg, Some Experts Say
Colleges Share the Responsibility for the Recent Riots, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998,
at A48 (describing student riots in response to efforts to enforce underage drinking laws at Iowa
State University, Plymouth State University, the University of Connecticut, and Washington
State University). These protests have involved significant amounts of violence. See Jane
Hadley & Steve Miletich, 23 Officers Hurt in Clash at WSU: National Guard on Alert after
Party Turns Violent, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 1998, at A1 (describing injuries
inflicted by students protesting enforcement of alcohol laws at Washington State University).
258
“Sila [morality] as practiced by the Buddha may be said to be the widest [moral principle] in
scope. . . . The second moral precept of refraining from taking what is not given . . . involves
abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to social disintegration.” U.
Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism, in THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM
1, 17-18 (Samdhong Rinpoche ed., 1972).
259
Exodus 23:8 (“and you shall take no bribe . . . for a bribe blinds the officials”); Ecclesiastes
7:7 (“and a bribe corrupts the mind”); see David Neff, When Economists Pray, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 13 (“Corruption ‘so undermines society that there is a virtual breakdown
of legitimate order.’” (quoting Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics)).
260
See J.C. Cleary & Patrice Higonnet, Plasticity Into Power: Two Crises in the History of
France and China, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 664, 669 (1987) (“principled Confucian officials often
lamented that despite their best intentions, the entrenched corruption of the petty functionaries
made it impossible to put into effect a truly moral administration.”).
261
In reviewing organic works of the Hindu faith, Upendra Thakur notes that “a perusal of the
Smrti works makes it clear that the earlier Smrti writers prescribe a much more drastic
punishment for the bribe seeker [than for the bribe giver,] who finds a graphic mention in one of
the early inscriptions. Manu and Visnu also ordain that the entire property of bribe-consuming
officials should be confiscated by the king. Yajnavalkya, however, provides banishment for such
social offenders. Kautilya, the astute observer of men and affairs, gives a graphic description of

Judaism,263 Sikhism,264 and Taoism.265 No empirical study has ever found a society that actually
embraces corruption.266
To the extent that persons may not expect prosecution, it is more likely the result of
cynicism than a feeling that corruption should not be prosecuted. In endemically corrupt polities,
such as Ukraine while Kuchma was President, enforcement of criminal laws can be very
difficult.267 The ability to bribe corrupt judges and prosecutors makes enforcement of corruption
measures to apprehend such an official, and like Yajnavalkya prescribes banishment for such
officials.” UPENDRA THAKUR, CORRUPTION IN ANCIENT INDIA 14 (1979).
262
See QORAN, Sura 2:184 (“Not to consume each others’ wealth unjustly, nor offer it to judges
as bribes, so that, with their aid, you might seize other men’s property unjustly.); Sura 28:77
(“Allah loveth not corrupters.”). “Islam as a religious doctrine has waged constant war against
all forms of corruption. . . . According to Islam, corruption is a sin for which there is no
atonement. The Quran in unmistakable terms has pointed out that all those who indulge in
corruption will be subject to eternal chastisement. Corruption is an immoral activity which
deserves universal condemnation.” SHAUKAT ALI, CORRUPTION: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE
49 (1985).
263
See Deuteronomy 16:19 (“neither shall you take a bribe”); 1 SÉFER HAHINUCH, THE BOOK OF
EDUCATION 325 (1978) (“Among the laws of the precept, there is what our Sages of blessed
memory said, that both the one who gives and the one who accepts [the bribe] violate a negative
precept . . ..”).
264
“The main object of Sikh polity, it may again be emphasized, is ‘righteous rule.’ This can be
obtained either by transforming the existing corrupt rulers on moral and ethical lines of religion
through peaceful persuasions, or by replacing their corrupt rule by a ‘just’ regime – if necessary,
with the help of arms.” HARBANS SINGH, DEGH, TEGH, FATEH: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOPOLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF SIKHISM 141(1986).
265
“The courts are all swept very clean; while the fields are full of weeds; and the granaries are
all empty. Their clothing -- richly embroidered and colored; while at their waists they carry
sharp swords. They gorge themselves on food, and of possessions they have plenty. This is
called thievery! And thievery certainly isn’t the Way!” LAO TZU, TE-TAO CHING 22 (trans.
Robert G. Hendricks 1989) (168 b.c.); see also ALI, supra note 262, at 38 (attributing statement
“The more laws are promulgated the more thieves and bandits there will be” to Lao Tzu).
266
See Heymann, supra note 159, at 328-29 (“The people of every country hate corruption and
feel cheated by it.”). Empirical research has found small segments of societies that embrace
corruption. Research has also found societies in which a majority of people engage in corrupt
activities, but as scholars from a variety of countries point out, this does not mean that people
embrace or accept the practice. The author of this paper has conducted research in Africa,
Central and East Asia, Europe, and Central America and has found universal condemnation of
corruption.
267
See THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 13 (1997) (noting that official enforcement bodies in corrupt states are themselves
susceptible to corruption); Celeste Boeri, How to Solve Argentina’s Debt Crisis: Will the IMF’s
Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 251 (2003) (“Dependence on [a] legally enforced strategy is
likely to be ineffective.”); O. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for
the Private Market and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 467-68 (2001) (“Other problems
have been caused by widespread corruption and an inadequate enforcement process to implement

laws particularly difficult.268 Daryl Levinson warns that weak enforcement agencies confronted
with powerful corrupt actors will become corrupt themselves269 Corrupt agencies and a
diminished expectation of enforcement do not constitute cultural acceptance of an illegal act.
6. Lazarenko-type Prosecutions as a Tool to Fight Corruption
Ukraine illustrates the sensitivity of this problem in fighting corruption. The election of
Viktor Yushchenko represented progress toward a stable and open democratic process.270 The

laws, underscoring the need for a developed legal system to interpret and enforce rules and to
settle disputes over owned resources.”); Stephen J. Toope, Legal and Judicial Reform through
Development Assistance: Some Lessons, 48 MCGILL L.J. 357, 375 (2003) (stating that
enforcement of corruption laws is impossible if enforcers are corrupt).
268
See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Foreign Nationals in the United States Witness Security Program:
A Remedy for Every Wrong?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2003) (“In a number of nations,
formal institutions are undermined by corruption, violence, or other factors that counteract
efforts of law enforcement authorities.”); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (2003) (criticizing “corrupt
politicians pressing to abolish or weaken regulations and cripple enforcement”); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1398 (2003) (noting that corruption impedes
the enforcement of rules by state entities); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 825 (2003) (describing the difficulty of
pursuing case of corruption against enforcement agencies).
269
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 390-91 (2003); see Bruce L.
Benson, Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons”
Arising with Public Allocation Processes, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1988) (discussing the
corruption of entities charged with enforcing corruption standards); Hiram E. Chodosh,
Emergence from the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587, 601 (2003) (“Vague
ethical norms, a poorly regulated and fragmented body of legal professionals, weak monitoring
capacity, corrupted review systems, and ineffectual prosecution and enforcement substantially
sustain systemic impunity for illicit practices.”).
270
See Anders Åslund, The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, 46
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECONOMICS 327-353 (2005) (discussing the economic policy of
Ukraine following Yushchenko’s election, which although the author finds excessively populist
is still much better than that of the authoritarian regime); Taras Kuzio, From Kuchma to
Yushchenko, PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29, 29-40 (discussing the
progress made following Yushchenko’s election); Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks on Judicial
Independence, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1, (2006) (noting the “level of transparency atypical for the exSoviet world” that accompanied the struggle over the election of Yushchenko); Magdaleno RoseAvila, Transforming Social Justice: Stand Up for Your Rights, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 575, 578
(2005) (“Viktor Yushenko and his supporters protested in the cold wintry streets of Kiev and
brought the government to a halt. New elections were ordered and, in the end, Yushenko won.
Ukrainians stood up for their rights and they succeeded in reaching their goals in spite of the
enormous challenges that they faced.”); Hans van Zon, Why the Orange Revolution Succeeded, 6
PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS & SOCIETY 373-402 (2005) (explaining how the “orange

appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko raises questions. Tymoshenko accrued millions of dollars
during her presidency of Ukraine Energy Systems.271 In part, her success as president of that
company emanated from her corrupt relationship with Pavlo Lazarenko.272 During her brief
tenure as Prime Minister she continued to request extradition of Lazarenko to Ukraine. Without
casting aspersions on Ukraine, it is fair to question the efficacy of a corruption case against him
in that country.
The tremendous amount of damage wrought by corruption, in tandem with the difficulty
in eradicating corruption from endemically corrupt systems, has lead to a global, albeit
uncoordinated, effort to deal with corruption.273 Obviously, improvements to infrastructure,
education, and the political process garner much attention in this effort.274 The aspect of the
global effort most pertinent to the Lazarenko prosecution, however, regards adjudication of
claims of corruption. This adjudication occurs pursuant to a patchwork of rules and agreements,
ranging from international treaties to local laws.
6.1 Treaties
Several treaties, most promulgated within the last dozen years, focus on prosecution of
corruption. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has promulgated the
most lauded of the international treaties in its Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign

revolution” succeeded and noting that “the Orange Revolution gives a unique opportunity to
create a culture of democracy and to establish the rule of law.”).
271
See MATTHEW BRZEZINSKI, CASINO MOSCOW (2001) (describing Tymoshenko as a billionaire
and the only female oligarch in the post-Soviet countries).
272
See Alex Rodriguez, Ousted Premier Eyes Comeback, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 9, 2005, at C3
(describing the relationship and noting that Tymoshenko was named in Lazarenko’s indictment);
Andrey Slivka, Bitter Orange, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at mag. 24 (describing this relationship
and stating that “[h]er rebranding of herself as a populist fighter, then, is one of the stranger
stories in Eastern European politics”).
273
See Robert E. Lutz, On Combating the Culture of Corruption, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 263,
267 (2004) (noting the “sea-change” in international attitudes toward corruption and stating that
“the issue of official and business corruption has become a major focus of international
cooperation”); Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23 (“[I]t
is difficult to think of a significant international organization not looking at corruption.”).
274
The United States Department of Commerce’s Good Governance Program, for example,
assists governments and businesses in strengthening institutions, developing business ethics, and
developing strategies to cooperatively combat corruption. See Good Governance Program,
http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/. Similarly, the World Bank Institute’s Governance and
Anti-Corruption program attempts to strengthen government institutions. See World Bank
Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,menuPK:46
1646~pagePK:64156143~piPK:64154155~theSitePK:461606,00.html. See generally Philip M.
Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1307 (2004) (describing
business lead initiatives to combat corruption).

Government Officials in International Business Transactions.275 The treaty itself does not create
regulations; it instead requires signatories to implement functionally equivalent laws.276 The
treaty sets forth five requirements. First, the signatory must criminalize the payment of bribes to
foreign public officials with respect to the conduct of transnational business.277 Second, it must
take the size of the bribe or of its effects into account and make the bribe subject to seizure or
provide for comparable penalties.278 Third, the signatory must impose penalties for bribing
foreign public officials that are comparable to those imposed for the bribery of domestic
officials.279 Fourth, with respect to jurisdiction, the signatory must provide for jurisdiction over
275

Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, OECD/DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16/FINAL (18 Dec. 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, entered into force 15 Feb. 1999 (“OECD Convention”); see Barbara
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 OECD Convention: An
Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37
AM. BUS. L.J. 485 (2000) (lauding the OECD Convention); Hess & Dunfee, supra note 247, at
602 (“The most significant advancement in the fight against corruption and the strongest
demonstration of its universal condemnation is the [OECD Convention].”); Nii Lante WallaceBruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business – The Dawn of a New Era, 24
MELBOURNE U. L.R. 349, 368 (2000) (“Perhaps the most significant step in the efforts to combat
corruption in global business was taken on 17 December 1997 in Paris, when members of the
OECD signed the [OECD Convention].”); Jong Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD
Bribery Convention: Implications for Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 245, 254 (2000) (“the OECD Bribery Convention has built the most significant multilateral
instrument in the fight against bribery and corruption”).
276
See Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical
Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 893-94
(2000) (“The aim is that the signatories, by national implementation, will provide clear and
detailed rules that are functionally equivalent to one another in punishing and deterring bribery in
international business.”).
277
OECD Convention, supra note 275, art. 1. Specifically, article 1 requires that the
implementing legislation
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence
under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official
act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business . . .
Id.

278

Id. art. 3. If criminal liability cannot be imposed on legal persons under the existing legal
system of the implementing country, the Convention does not require that criminal liability be
imposed. Instead, it requires that other “dissuasive” measures be taken, which might include
civil monetary sanctions. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
279
Id. art. 3, para. 1.

all such acts committed in whole or in sufficient part within its territory, and if nationality
jurisdiction is recognized by that country must also extend extraterritorial jurisdiction based on
that principle.280 Fifth, the signatory must allow extradition of its nationals charged with the
bribery of foreign public officials or must prosecute them itself.281
The OECD’s treaty is only one of many. In 1996 the Organization of American States
promulgated a treaty that requires its members to take certain actions with respect to
transnational bribery, including the criminalization of bribery of foreign officials.282 The treaty
also requires signatories to cooperate with one another in the prosecution of corrupt officials and
bribe givers. 283 The European Union has promulgated two instruments that deal with
corruption. The Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the Communities’ Financial
Interests requires member states to criminalize corruption that involves the financial interests of
the European Union itself.284 The European Union has also promulgated a general treaty that,
albeit in a limited way, requires member states to criminalize transnational bribery.285 The
Council of Europe, a broader grouping than the European Union, has promulgated a treaty that
imposes on its members requirements similar to those imposed by the OECD’s convention on
corruption.286 The MERCOSUR Treaty of Asuncion requires MERCOSUR members to impose
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Id. art 4.
Id. art. 10, para. 3.
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Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, art. 5; see
Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Comparison With
the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 243, 247-49 (1998)
(discussing the requirement); see Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to Combatting the
Financing of Crime: A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 573 (2005) (“The
involvement by the OECD and the OAS in the implementation of anti-corruption laws have
contributed positively to the identification of problems and education of states and interested
parties.”).
283
The treaty requires signatories to allow extradition of bribe givers and bribe-taking officials
and contains a pledge that signatories will not invoke bank secrecy laws to impede investigations
into corruption. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 282, art. XIII
(extradition), art. XVI (bank secrecy); see David P. Warner, Law Enforcement Cooperation in
the Organization of American States: A Focus on Remja, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387,
393 (2006) (discussing requirements).
284
Council Act of 27 September 1996 Drawing up a Protocol to the Convention on the
Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests, 1996 O.J. (C 313) 1.
285
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195/1). The
treaty requires members to criminalize bribery of European Union officials or of officials of
member states. Id. art. 8; see Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International
Law, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 395-399 (2000) (explicating two European Union
agreements).
286
Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Jan. 27, 1999), Europ. T.S. No.
173; see Jarmila Lajcakova, Violation of Human Rights Through State Tolerance of Street-Level
Bribery: Case Study, Slovakia, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111, 122, 130-31 (2003) (discussing
Council of Europe Convention).
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and harmonize criminal penalties for certain types of corruption.287 The African Union has set
out a treaty that requires African states to criminalize corruption, to seize proceeds of corrupt
relationships, and to cooperate in the prosecution of transnational corruption.288 In addition to
regional treaties, the United Nations has set forth the Convention Against Corruption, which also
requires criminalization of corruption and requires confiscation of illicitly acquired assets.289
In general, international treaties first impose on signatory nations a requirement to
impose criminal penalties on their own residents who enter into corrupt relationships with
foreign officials, and second coordinate enforcement among signatories. Treaties do not impose
controls on the behaviors of local officials, including officials whose behavior crosses state
borders.
6.2. International Tribunals
Although the organic documents of international criminal tribunals do not specifically
confer subject matter over corruption, such jurisdiction certainly is conceivable.290 Many
scholars suggest the International Criminal Court as the natural body for enforcing vigorous
international norms prohibiting corruption.291 Indeed, many countries supported the
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development of the court specifically because prosecution in corrupted local courts proved
impossible.292 At a minimum, it is likely that an international criminal tribunal could exercise
jurisdiction to prosecute egregious cases of corruption, particularly if the corrupt acts were
closely tied with other extreme abuses.293
International arbitral tribunals do not have the power to prosecute corrupt individuals.
They do, however, have the power to negate or void transactions in which corruption has played
a part. In ICC Case Number 1110, Judge Gunnar Lagergren opened the door for invalidation of
corrupt contracts:
Finally, it cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law
recognised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores
or international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they
cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators. This principle is especially apt for
use before international arbitration tribunals that lack a “law of the forum” in the
ordinary sense of the term.294
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Judge Lagergen excused himself on the grounds of jurisdiction, but following tribunals have
more aggressively followed his lead.295 The unfolding of this doctrine over the last forty years is
interestingly. While a plethora of reasons support an arbitral tribunal’s voidance of a contract on
grounds of corruption,296 a clear doctrine has emerged that international law and international
order have developed standards against corruption that an international tribunal must uphold.297
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The growing number of international treaties that deal with corruption explicitly support the
tribunals in this finding.298
6.3. Local Law
Local law also contributes to the web of rules regulating corrupt behaviors. Corruption is
illegal in every country in the world.299 While the particulars of hundreds of local laws defy
detailed explication, for the most part these laws impose criminal sanctions on persons who
corrupt local officials, and on local officials for local corruption.300 Pursuant to international
treaty obligations, many countries also impose criminal sanctions on private persons who engage
in transnational bribery.301 On the other hand, no similar treaty provision exists for the public
analog to these private transnational actors; local laws can only reach part – at most – of an act
that occurs throughout several jurisdictions. While the local portion of their corrupt actions may
be actionable, the totality of their conduct escapes censure.
6.4. The Role of Lazarenko-type Prosecution
In the aggregate, these bodies of laws and rules create a network that regulates most
corrupt behavior. Graphically, the network could be described as follows:
The Patchwork of Transnational Corruption Regulation
What
Does What
treaties
create expectations and requirements
tribunals
criminally prosecute significant events
arbitration
negate major
local laws
criminally prosecute
local laws
criminally prosecute
local laws
negate
local laws
ignore
local laws
criminally prosecute

To Whom
of countries
by individuals
transactions
local public officials
local private actors
local transactions
transnational public officials
transnational private actors

This network, however, contains an obvious hole. Local laws, standing on their own, do not
reach the full extent of official corruption that crosses borders. The Lazarenko prosecution fills
in this hole. By cobbling together local laws from two jurisdictions, the Lazarenko court enabled
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consideration of Lazarenko’s actions. Rather than ignoring misconduct that occurred in another
jurisdiction, on a theory that whatever occurs in another jurisdiction must be outside the purview
of its scrutiny,302 the court not only allowed for consideration of Ukrainian law but also
undertook the task of determining that law and factually evaluating whether that law was
violated. In doing so, the court developed a technique that fills in the gap in the network of rules
controlling corruption; a technique that other courts can easily replicate.
Conclusion
Law supports and regulates interaction within communities. Communities within nations
are very important. They are hardly, however, the only types of communities that people may
form. Changes in technology and changes in mindsets allow the formation of communities with
little reference to political borders. Local laws that stop at the borders do little to support these
communities. International law, which does not recognize most transnational persons as
legitimate subjects of international law, does even less.
Pavlo Lazarenko provides a glaring example of the potential abuse of the holes created by
the failure of international law. Lazarenko created a network that moved illegally acquired
monies across several borders. Lazarenko’s activities are especially damaging because he
violated the trust placed in him by the people of Ukraine, and in doing so caused extraordinary
damage to that country. The behaviors of Pavlo Lazarenko and other corrupt officials necessitate
control. Again, however, if local law stops at the border and international law does not
recognize corrupt officials, then law will not reach the full extent of their actions.
The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko demonstrates one means of controlling transnational
corruption, and provides an interesting study of the cobbling together of local laws to deal with
transnational actions in general. In order to prosecute Lazarenko in a U.S. court, the court
melded together the laws of Ukraine and the laws of the United States. In order to prove its case,
the prosecution not only had to prove violation of U.S. laws but also had to prove violation of
Ukrainian laws. The jury considered the case and rendered a verdict.
This court’s adroit melding of laws demonstrates the possibilities attainable by the use of
local laws. The court’s clumsy treatment of the honest services required of a Ukrainian official,
on the other hand, also evince the need for a thoughtful and sensitive approach to the application
of local laws to an act that crosses borders.
Cobbled-together local laws are not a perfect substitute for laws propagated by a
transnational community itself. While the Westphalian bestowal of a monopoly in international
relations to nations does not withstand factual scrutiny, concepts of sovereignty retain vitality
both in law and in the ordering of transnational relations. Thus, care must be taken not to
transgress the law of nations while controlling the actions of individuals. The prosecution of
corrupt officials can be accomplished without violating those rules.
The prosecution of corrupt officials comprises a critical element of growth and
development, whether at the global or individual level. Corruption presents a significant
obstacle to the enhancement of democratic institutions, and corruption imposes tremendous costs
on societies and the individual people who make up those societies. The prosecution of Pavlo
Lazarenko marks a degree of justice for those who have suffered in Ukraine. The creation of a
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tool to combat transnational corruption offers possible amelioration for many more who suffer
the degradations of corruption.

